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ADVANCING A NETWORK OF SAFETY MEASURES IN THE 
BERING STRAIT REGION: NOW IS THE TIME  
 




Climate change impacts have been particularly acute in the Arctic, 
where warming has led to the loss of seasonal sea ice, among other 
impacts. As Arctic waters experience longer ice-free seasons and 
reduced sea ice extent and thickness, vessel traffic in the maritime 
Arctic has increased. Experts forecast this growth trend will 
continue and accelerate. Increasing vessel traffic brings threats to 
the Arctic region, its people, and its wildlife. These include 
increased air, water, and subsea noise pollution and the potential 
for a large oil and/or fuel spill. While authorities have put in place 
some management measures designed to reduce these threats, more 
action is needed to safeguard the region. Impacts from increasing 
shipping in the Arctic region can be further mitigated by both 
Arctic-specific rules and best practices and broader changes to 
global-scale shipping practices. More broadly, improvements to 
governance structures are needed to better address the multiple and 
overlapping threats to the Arctic region. At the same time, these 
changes can promote full and meaningful participation by 
Indigenous residents of the Arctic with respect to the identification, 
design, and implementation of management measures that may 
affect their region. On a global scale, reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions is critically important for the future of the Arctic and its 














Climate change is having dramatic impacts throughout the 
world, including on the ocean. These impacts are particularly acute 
in the Arctic, which is warming twice as fast as the rest of the 
planet.1 Warming temperatures and diminishing seasonal sea ice—
along with increasing interest in commercial exploitation of natural 
resources—have facilitated and driven growth in vessel traffic in the 
maritime Arctic.2 This growth is expected to continue and 
accelerate.  
 
A 2012 article entitled Arctic Bottleneck: Protecting the 
Bering Strait Region from Increased Vessel Traffic examined risks 
from increasing levels of vessel traffic in the Bering Strait region of 
the Arctic.3 Here, we build upon and update that work. While the 
focus is once again on the Bering Strait region as the maritime nexus 
between the Arctic and Pacific oceans, this Article also considers 
maritime traffic in U.S. Arctic waters more broadly. 
 
The sections below discuss increasing threats, review 
important advancements in Arctic vessel traffic management, and 
address some of the key challenges and opportunities that remain. 
They consider how impacts of increasing Arctic vessel traffic can 
be mitigated through Arctic-specific rules and best practices 
 
1 Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., The Changing Arctic: A greener, 
warmer and increasingly accessible region (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://www.noaa.gov/explainers/changing-arctic-greener-warmer-and-
increasingly-accessible-region [https://perma.cc/NSC3-X7BQ]. 
2 For purposes of this Article, Arctic waters include the Bering Sea and waters 
surrounding the Aleutian Islands. This is consistent with the Arctic Research and 
Policy Act of 1984 (as amended), which defines Arctic to mean “all United 
States and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all United States 
territory north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and 
Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the 
Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain.” 15 U.S.C. § 4111 
(1984).  
3 Hartsig et al., Arctic Bottleneck: Protecting the Bering Strait Region from 
Increased Vessel Traffic, 18 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 35, 35-87 (2012). 
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combined with broader changes that affect shipping practices on a 
global scale. More broadly, this Article examines how 
improvements to governance structures could better address the 
multiple and overlapping threats to the Arctic region and better 
promote full and meaningful participation by Indigenous residents 
of the Arctic with respect to the identification, design, and 
implementation of management measures that may affect their 
region. Finally, it underscores that reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions on a global scale is critically important for the Arctic, its 
peoples and wildlife, and more widely for the ocean and all who 
depend upon it. 
 
II. AN EXTRAORDINARY REGION UNDERGOING EXTRAORDINARY 
CHANGE 
 
The U.S. Arctic is home to Indigenous Peoples who have 
lived there for millennia and wildlife that are exquisitely adapted to 
a challenging environment. It encompasses vast stretches of marine 
waters, including U.S. portions of the sea surrounding the Aleutian 
Islands, Bering Sea, Bering Strait, Chukchi Sea, and Beaufort Sea. 
 
The Bering Strait—a narrow marine passage between the 
United States and Russia—is a particularly noteworthy part of the 
Arctic.4 Only fifty-five miles wide at its narrowest point, it is the 
sole marine connection between the Pacific and Arctic oceans and 
is a critical migration corridor. Thousands of marine mammals and 
millions of seabirds pass through the Bering Strait each year to 
access the abundant summer Arctic ecosystem.5 The region provides 
key habitat for Pacific walrus, beluga, bowhead, gray whales, polar 
 
4 See Appendix 1. 
5 Oceana & Kawerak, Inc., BERING STRAIT MARINE LIFE AND SUBSISTENCE USE 
DATA SYNTHESIS 33 (July 2014), available at 
https://oceana.org/sites/default/files/final_pdf_bering_strait_synthesis_july_30_
2014_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5PQ-GT2R].  
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bears, and bearded, ringed, and spotted seals.6 Millions of birds from 
all over the world come to the Bering Strait region, including 
“[a]uklets, gulls, eiders, loons, shearwaters, fulmars, terns, and 
kittiwakes.”7 Yup’ik, Inupiat, and Saint Lawrence Island Yupik 
peoples rely on this highly productive ecosystem as a key source of 
food security and culture. In the Bering Strait region alone, there are 
twenty federally recognized Tribes.8 Tribal communities have many 
concerns with vessel traffic in the region.9  
 
The Arctic is particularly vulnerable to climate change.10 Sea 
ice, one of the primary drivers for the ecosystem, is reaching record 
lows year after year.11 Historically, sea ice has given residents of the 
Bering Strait a platform upon which they could safely travel, hunt, 
and fish, and has offered protection from coastal erosion caused by 
storm surge. Diminishing sea ice removes these benefits and 
protections, putting residents of Arctic coastal communities and 
their food security at increasing risk.12  
 
6 Id.  
7 Id.   
8 Julie Raymond-Yakoubian, Conceptual and Institutional Frameworks for 
Protected Areas, and the Status of Indigenous Involvement: Considerations for 
the Bering Strait Region of Alaska, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ GOVERNANCE OF 
LAND AND PROTECTED TERRITORIES IN THE ARCTIC 84, 84 (Thora Martina 
Hermann & Thibault Martin eds., 2016). 
9 See Julie Raymond-Yacoubian, Arctic Vessel Traffic and Indigenous 
Communities in the Bering Strait Region 
of Alaska, in SUSTAINABLE SHIPPING IN A CHANGING ARCTIC, WMU STUDIES IN 
MARITIME AFFAIRS (L. P. Hildebrand et al. eds. 2018) available at 
https://kawerak.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Raymond-Yakoubian-
2018.pdf, [https://perma.cc/6UHU-S4JC] (hereinafter Arctic Vessel Traffic and 
Indigenous Communities). 
10 Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., The changing Arctic: A greener, 
warmer and increasingly accessible region  275, 275 (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://www.noaa.gov/explainers/changing-arctic-greener-warmer-and-
increasingly-accessible-region, [https://perma.cc/NSC3-X7BQ]. 
11 See generally, Nat’l Snow & Ice Data Ctr., State of the Cryosphere: Sea Ice 
(Nov. 20, 2018), https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/sotc/sea_ice.html, 
[https://perma.cc/YH9Q-UA6B].  
12 Julia O’Malley, Alaska Relies on Ice. What Happens When It Can’t Be 
Trusted?, N.Y. TIMES (April 10, 2019), 
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Loss of sea ice also has profound and widespread impacts on 
the Arctic marine ecosystem. For instance, in 2017 and 2018, the 
Bering Sea “cold pool”—a region of cold water that historically 
acted as a thermal barrier between the southeastern Bering Sea and 
the northern Bering Sea—shrank significantly.13 This resulted in 
large numbers of commercially important fish species such as 
pollock and cod moving north.14 Changes in sea ice extent and the 
cold pool are driving fundamental shifts that ripple through the 
ecosystem, affecting everything from phytoplankton blooms to fish, 
birds, and marine mammals.15 These changes have direct impacts on 
the region’s Indigenous Peoples, who are part of the ecosystem and 
rely on these animals for sustenance and culture. 
 
Climate change also facilitates commercial and industrial 
activity by making the region more accessible.16 Going forward, the 




13 Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Scientific Teams Set Out to Track 
Unprecedented Changes in the Eastern Bering Sea (April 18, 2018),  
https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/feature-story/scientific-teams-set-out-track-
unprecedented-changes-eastern-bering-sea [https://perma.cc/VDD4-7LZU].  
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 A. Siders et al., A dynamic ocean management proposal for the Bering Strait 
region, 74 MARINE POLICY 177, 178 (2016). 
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commercial fishing,17 oil and gas development,18 and onshore 
mining operations in Canada and the United States.19 Vessel traffic 
is expected to grow in support of these extractive industries.20 The 
shipping sector also uses Arctic waters to connect ports in North 
America and Europe to ports in Asia.21 Trans-Arctic shipping routes 
include the Northern Sea Route, which traverses waters north of 
Russia, and the Northwest Passage, which threads through 
archipelagic waters north of Canada. As Arctic sea ice continues to 
diminish, the Transpolar Sea Route—which runs “over the top” via 
the North Pole—could also become a viable option for trans-Arctic 
shipping, perhaps, as early as mid-century.22 Importantly, the 
 
17 That said, there are precautionary fishing management measures in place in 
Arctic waters. For instance, the northern Bering Sea is currently closed to 
bottom trawling. See Amendment 89 to the Fishery Management Plan for 
Groundfish of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Management Area (FMP) to 
Establish Bering Sea Habitat Conservation Measures, Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 
43,362 (July 25, 2008). The high seas of the Central Arctic Ocean and the U.S. 
Arctic fishery management area north of the Bering Strait are currently closed to 
commercial fishing. See Agreement to prevent unregulated high seas fisheries in 
the Central Arctic Ocean (Oct. 3, 2018); available at https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2019.073.01.0003.01.ENG, 
[https://perma.cc/X2NC-9KPH]; and N. Pac. Fisheries Mgm’t Council, FISHERY 
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR FISH RESOURCES OF THE ARCTIC MANAGEMENT AREA 
(2009), available at https://www.npfmc.org/wp-
content/PDFdocuments/fmp/Arctic/ArcticFMP.pdf [https://perma.cc/HD2P-
RDF5]. 
18 While the Bering Strait region and other Arctic waters are not currently open 
for offshore oil and gas leasing, they have been targeted for future leasing by the 
Trump Administration’s 2019–2024 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and 
Gas Leasing Draft Proposed Program. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgm’t, 2019–
2024 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Draft Proposed 
Program 1 (2018). 
19 U.S. Comm. on the Marine Transp. Sys., Draft: A Ten-Year Projection of 
Maritime Activity in the U.S. Arctic Region, 2020-2030 37–42 (July 2019) 
[hereinafter CMTS 2019 Draft Projection], available at 
https://www.cmts.gov/downloads/2019_ArcticVesselProjections_draft.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DL9C-ZY6R]. 
20 See generally id. 
21 See Appendix 2.  
22 See id. at 70–71 (noting that while the transpolar sea route is not expected to 
open to most vessels before mid-century, its use could grow quickly when it 
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Northern Sea Route, the Northwest Passage, and the Transpolar Sea 
Route all pass through the Bering Strait to connect the Arctic Ocean 
to the Bering Sea and Pacific Ocean.  
 
The bulk of this Article focuses on managing shipping 
activities in U.S. Arctic waters. However, impacts from increased 
vessel traffic are just one strand in a much broader web of changes 
affecting the region. Given the multiple threats it faces, effective 
management of the Arctic region will require a comprehensive 
approach to governance, including full and meaningful involvement 
in decision-making by Indigenous residents. More broadly, it will 
require global-scale action to address the fundamental threat of 
climate change.  
 
III. ARCTIC VESSEL TRAFFIC: OPERATIONS, ROUTES, GROWTH 
TRENDS, AND ASSOCIATED RISKS 
 
The volume of vessel traffic in the Arctic has already grown 
substantially and is predicted to continue to grow in the future.23 As 
Arctic vessel traffic increases, so do impacts from and risks of 
conflicts and accidents. 
 
A.  Arctic Vessel Operations and Predictions for Growth 
 
Many economic sectors contribute to the overall volume of 
vessel traffic in Arctic waters. Commercial operators bring supplies 
and fuel to western Alaska communities using tugs, barges, and 
tankers.24 Extractive industries—including oil and gas and mining 
 
becomes seasonally ice-free). See also James E. Overland & Muyin Wang, 
When will the summer Arctic be nearly sea ice free? 40 GEOPHYSICAL RES. 
LETTERS 2097, 2097 (2013) (noting future sea ice loss in the Arctic is very 
likely in the “first half of the 21st century, with a possibility of major loss within 
a decade or two”). 
23 CMTS 2019 Draft Projection, supra note 19, at vi.  
24 Nuka Res. & Planning Group, LLC, OVERVIEW OF TANKER LIGHTERING IN 
ARCTIC ALASKA 2-3 (2019) [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF TANKER LIGHTERING], 
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operations—generate significant levels of vessel traffic.25 Cruise 
ships of varying sizes take tourists to destinations in the Arctic. A 
large and economically important commercial fishing fleet operates 
in southern portions of the Bering Sea,26 and scientists conduct 
studies from research vessels.27 In addition to these commercial 
operations, subsistence hunters pursue marine mammals from small 
skiffs, sometimes operating far from shore.28  
 
Relative to other global shipping routes, the U.S. Arctic and 
the Bering Strait currently experience low volumes of commercial 
vessel traffic.29 Nonetheless, traffic levels in the region have already 
 
available at https://oceanconservancy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/190306-
OC-Lightering-Report-vFINAL.pdf, [https://perma.cc/V5GW-JX7U].  
25 See, e.g., Nuka Res. & Planning Group, LLC, BERING SEA VESSEL TRAFFIC 
RISK ANALYSIS 49 (2016) (noting that vessel traffic from Shell’s offshore oil 
and gas exploration in 2015 generated a spike in vessel traffic) [hereinafter 
BERING SEA RISK ANALYSIS], available at https://oceanconservancy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/bering-sea-vessel-traffic-1.pdf, 
[https://perma.cc/L3QU-652C]. 
26 N. Pac. Fishery Mgm’t Council, BERING SEA FISHERY ECOSYSTEM PLAN 75 




df [https://perma.cc/5KQ6-K43S].   
27 B. Konar et al., Development of best practices for scientific research vessel 
operations in a 
changing Arctic: A case study for R/V Sikuliaq, 86 MARINE POLICY 182, 182-83 
(2017) (noting increased use of research vessels in Arctic waters), available at 
https://www.unols.org/sites/default/files/Sikuliaq%20Marine%20Policy%20pap
er.pdf [https://perma.cc/MUT4-4YX3].   
28 See, e.g, Oceana & Kawerak, Inc., supra note 5, at 112 (noting hunters may 
travel up to 100 miles from their communities).  
29 See, e.g., Benjamin Glick, Is the Arctic Shipping Route Closer to being a 
Viable Alternative?, TRADING THOUGHTS: GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIV. VAN 
ANDEL GLOBAL TRADE CTR. (undated), 
https://vagtc.wordpress.com/2017/02/20/is-the-arctic-shipping-route-closer-to-
being-a-viable-alternative/ [https://perma.cc/7BW5-DVE6] (noting that while 
fewer than 20 ships went through the Arctic passages in 2015, almost 14,000 
ships transited the Panama Canal and 18,000 transited the Suez Canal). 
2020] Safety Measures in the Bering Strait Region 73 
 
experienced substantial increases in recent years.30 As Arctic sea ice 
continues to diminish31 and the ice-free season continues to 
lengthen, vessel traffic in the region is expected to keep growing.32 
 
1.  Trans-Arctic Shipping 
 
Going forward, shipping companies will likely make greater 
use of trans-Arctic shipping routes to transport cargo. These routes 
save significant time and fuel, particularly when transiting from 
Asia to Europe. In the years ahead, the Northern Sea Route is poised 
to experience significant growth in transit traffic, which could 
“dramatically alter the spread of vessel types transiting through the 
Bering Strait.”33 For instance, in 2018 a Maersk ship became the 
first to use the Northern Sea Route to transport containerized cargo, 
a voyage that may herald more widespread use of the route by 
container ships in the future.34 In addition, it is not too early to 
consider potential future use of the Transpolar Sea Route for 
commercial shipping. Persistent ice makes the route impractical at 
this time. However, as the Transpolar Sea Route becomes seasonally 
ice-free, traffic along the route could increase rapidly, in part 
“because the Transpolar Sea Route does not have the same draft 
restrictions as other trans-Arctic passages.”35 As noted above, all 
trans-Arctic shipping routes pass through the Bering Strait, so 
increased use of any, or all of these routes, will result in increased 
traffic through the Strait. 
 
 
30 See CMTS 2019 Draft Projection, supra note 19, at 15 (noting vessel traffic in 
the Bering Strait region has “steadily climbed since data collection began in 
2008, resulting in a 128% growth in 2018 over 2008 levels”). 
31 See, e.g., Nat’l Snow & Ice Data Ctr., supra note 11, (describing trends in 
Arctic sea ice loss).  
32 CMTS 2019 Draft Projection, supra note 19, at 68 (summarizing scenarios 
projecting vessel traffic growth in the U.S. Arctic region). 
33 Id. at 41. 
34 Id. at 40. 
35 Id. at 109.  
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2.  Arctic Marine Tourism 
 
Maritime tourism is another growth sector in the Arctic. In 
2016, the Crystal Serenity became the first large luxury cruise ship 
to transit the Northwest Passage, a feat it repeated in 2017.36 The 
company, Crystal Cruises, plans to return to Alaska in the future 
using a new, smaller, purpose-built polar-class vessel.37 Crystal 
Cruises is far from the only such company to invest in new ships 
intended for Arctic waters. A 2018 review found that at least twenty-
eight new expedition cruise ships capable of operating in Arctic 
waters would be launched within four years.38 Many of the new 
vessels will have robust construction that qualifies them to sail in 
more challenging and remote waters.39 As just one example, French 
operator Ponant intends to launch a specially-constructed vessel 
called Le Commandant Charcot, with plans to sail to the North Pole 
starting in 2021.40 
 
3.  Community Resupply and Infrastructure 
 
Vessel traffic that serves the needs of local Arctic 
communities is also poised to increase. Tug-and-barge and tanker 
 
36 Maritime Executive, New Crystal Ship for Northwest Passage (Oct. 1, 2017), 
https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/new-crystal-ship-for-northwest-
passage [https://perma.cc/J3RL-D938]. 
37 Id. See also Crystal Cruises, Crystal Expedition Cruises Appoints Captain 
Thomas Larsen to Helm Crystal Endeavor (June 18, 2019) (noting plans to sail 
to Alaska, the Aleutian Islands and the Northeast Passage, among other 
destinations), available at http://mediacenter.crystalcruises.com/crystal-
expedition-cruises-appoints-captain-thomas-larsen-to-helm-crystal-endeavor/ 
[https://perma.cc/L56U-58G7].  
38 Thomas Nilsen, Arctic cruise ship boom, BARENTS OBSERVER, May 22, 2018, 
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/travel/2018/05/arctic-cruise-ship-boom 
[https://perma.cc/HH2S-J8B7].  
39 See id. (noting new builds will be a “higher ice-class”). 
40 Malte Humpert, France’s Ponant to offer North Pole cruises starting in 2021, 
HIGH NORTH NEWS (May 22, 2019), https://www.arctictoday.com/frances-
ponant-to-offer-north-pole-cruises-starting-in-2021/ [https://perma.cc/JP4E-
QPB5].  
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traffic delivers supplies and fuel to coastal communities in Arctic 
Alaska that are not connected to the road system. While community 
resupply in Alaska has been stable for the past twenty-five or more 
years,41 recent reports indicate there may be an increase in the 
number of transits associated with this sector as operators expand 
service to northern communities and industrial areas.42 In addition, 
community infrastructure projects in western and Arctic Alaska—
ranging from port and road construction to airport runway and 
renewable wind energy projects—will likely generate additional 
vessel traffic as supplies are brought into the region.43 
 
4.  Extractive Industries 
 
As noted earlier, development and extraction of natural 
resources from the Arctic is also expected to contribute to a growth 
in vessel traffic in the region. Northern Sea Route cargo traffic 
associated with extractive industries is forecast to grow as Russia 
continues to bring online Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)44 and 
potential oil and coal development projects.45 The first shipment of 
LNG from Russia’s Yamal LNG project occurred in 2017.46 Going 
forward, Russia plans to ship more than a million tons of LNG from 
Yamal to markets in Europe and Asia using special icebreaking 
tankers.47 Overall, the Russian government has decreed the volume 
 
41 BERING SEA RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 23, at 58.  
42 CMTS 2019 Draft Projection, supra note 19, at 62. 
43 Id. at 49-57. 
44 Id. at 34. 
45 See Ariel Cohen, Russia Sets Sights On Energy Resources Under Arctic 
Circle, FORBES (April 17, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/04/17/russia-sets-sights-on-
energy-resources-under-arctic-circle/#13828dd6eea7 (describing potential oil 
and coal projects in the Russian Arctic and the need for additional vessels to 
facilitate development of those projects) [https://perma.cc/ZA6S-RD8C].  
46 CMTS 2019 Draft Projection, supra note 19, at 34. 
47 Id. 
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of goods shipped via the Northern Sea Route increase eight-fold 
from 2017 levels, reaching 80 million tons per year 2024.48  
 
In United States waters, any future exploration or 
development of Arctic oil and gas resources—both onshore and 
offshore—could also trigger significant increases in vessel traffic in 
the region.49 Shell’s efforts to explore for oil in the U.S. Arctic 
Ocean, for instance, generated substantial increases in transits of the 
Bering Strait.50 In addition to oil and gas activities, new or expanded 
onshore mining operations in Alaska could trigger growth in Arctic 
vessel traffic, which would come on top of vessel traffic that 
supports ongoing operations at the Red Dog mine.51 Similarly, 
expansion of mining operations in Arctic Canada could contribute 
to continued growth in vessel traffic.52 
 
5.  Other Sources of Growth in Arctic Vessel Traffic 
 
Other sectors may contribute to growth in vessel traffic in 
the U.S. Arctic and the Bering Strait region as well. Commercial 
fishing vessels may move into more northerly waters as they pursue 
 
48 Charles Digges, Putin decrees an increase in Arctic traffic, THE MARITIME 
EXECUTIVE (May 16, 2019), https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/putin-
decrees-an-increase-in-arctic-traffic [https://perma.cc/QYA6-ANNL]. See also 
Vladimir Putin, O natsionalnykh tselyakh i strategicheskikh zadachakh razbitiya 
Rossiskoy Federatsii na period do 2024 goda, (About national goals and 
strategic development objectives for the period up to 2024), DECREE OF THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FED. NO. 204 (May 7, 2018), https://xn--d1aqf.xn--
p1ai/media/news/ukaz-o-natsionalnykh-tselyakh-i-strategicheskikh-zadachakh-
razvitiya-rossiyskoy-federatsii-na-period/ (calling for development and 
expanded use of Northern Sea Route) [https://perma.cc/EE3X-M54N].  
49 CMTS 2019 Draft Projection, supra note 19, at 30–34.   
50 BERING SEA RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 25, at 49. See also CMTS 2019 Draft 
Projection, supra note 18, at 12 (noting that Shell’s “drill ship, anchor handling 
vessels, and anti-pollution ships” resulted in a surge of vessel activity in the 
region).  
51 See CMTS 2019 Draft Projection, supra note 19. 
52 See Id. 
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valuable fish stocks moving northward.53 The number of research 
vessels in the region has already increased, and would likely 
increase more, if and when commercial fishing expands 
northward.54 Overall, the number of vessels conducting research, 
law enforcement, and search and rescue activities in U.S. Arctic 
waters has increased, and is likely to continue to grow as “the 
demand for real-time environmental data in the region increases.”55 
Autonomous vessels may also contribute to this pattern of growth.56 
 
B.  Increasing Shipping Presents Risks to Safety and the 
Marine Environment 
 
As Arctic shipping traffic increases, so do its attendant risks. 
This section focuses on accidents that could jeopardize human life; 
conflicts with other maritime users; water, air, and noise pollution; 
ship strikes; and introduction of invasive species. 
 
1.  Vessel Accidents in the Arctic May Jeopardize Human Lives 
and Property 
 
53 Id. at 42-43. 
54 Id. at 41-43. 
55 Id. at 40. 
56 Id. 
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Arctic waters are widely recognized as remote,57 
hazardous,58 and poorly charted.59 Although modern vessels are 
highly capable, they are still vulnerable to accidents including 
damage caused by grounding, collision, or other sources; fires or 
explosions; failure of engines or other machinery; and other issues.60 
These accidents can jeopardize the lives of passengers and crew.  
 
Challenging conditions and lack of infrastructure mean that 
search and rescue operations in the Arctic marine environment are 
highly demanding.61 The U.S. Coast Guard “does not currently have 
the capability or capacity necessary to assure access in the high 
latitudes,” which “limits [its] ability to proactively manage risks” 
 
57 For example, the Coast Guard Air Station in Kodiak, Alaska—the nearest 
permanent base to the Arctic Ocean—is roughly 820 nautical miles south of the 
coastal community of Utqiagvik on Alaska’s North Slope. U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Security, ARCTIC SEARCH AND RESCUE: FISCAL YEAR 2017 REPORT 




58 Arctic waters are susceptible to “ice, dense fog, storms, high winds and 
waves, and freezing temperatures,” among other challenges. Pew Charitable 
Trusts, ARCTIC STANDARDS: RECOMMENDATIONS ON OIL SPILL PREVENTION, at 
6, RESPONSE, AND SAFETY IN THE U.S. ARCTIC OCEAN (Sept. 2013), available at 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2013/09/23/arcticstandardsfinal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MN5K-FXA5].  
59 As of late 2018, it was reported that just 4.1 percent of the Arctic waters off 
the coast of Alaska were charted to modern standards. Dermot Cole, Outdated 
navigational charts are an Arctic maritime disaster in the making, ARCTIC 
TODAY (Sept. 10, 2018), at 2, https://www.arctictoday.com/outdated-
navigational-charts-arctic-maritime-disaster-making/ [https://perma.cc/B46X-
2PVA].  
60 Arctic Council, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 87 (2009) [hereinafter 
AMSA 2009], 
https://www.pame.is/images/03_Projects/AMSA/AMSA_2009_report/AMSA_2
009_Report_2nd_print.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC7U-9MPQ].  
61 Timothy William James Smith, Search and Rescue in the Arctic: is the U.S. 
Prepared? 17 (Pardee RAND Grad. Sch., 2016), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD382.html 
[https://perma.cc/TJN9-5VNQ].  
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and “threatens the Nation’s ability to respond to crises in the Arctic, 
ranging from oil spills to contingency operations.”62 
 
While not in the U.S. Arctic, a recent incident in Norwegian 
waters highlights the harsh reality of these risks. In late March 2019, 
a passenger cruise ship traveling approximately 200 miles south of 
the Arctic Circle lost engine power amid gale-force winds and rough 
seas.63 Large waves battered the ship, smashing windows and 
sweeping passengers off their feet. Over 450 passengers were 
airlifted from the vessel.64 The ship eventually made it to a 
Norwegian port under its own power with nearly 900 passengers and 
crew still onboard.65 While no lives were lost, numerous passengers 
were injured66 and the rescue operation was a dangerous and costly 
undertaking. As more ships travel in Arctic waters, the potential for 
an accident that jeopardizes human life only increases. 
 
2.  Oil Spills from Vessels Threaten the Arctic Marine 
Environment 
 
A 2009 Arctic Council analysis concluded “[r]elease of oil 
into the Arctic marine environment, either through accidental 
release, or illegal discharge, is the most significant threat from 
 
62 U.S. Coast Guard, ARCTIC STRATEGIC OUTLOOK 26 (April 2019), at 6,11,24, 
https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_2019
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6A2K-ARG3].  
63 Simon Calder, Viking Sky: Why Things Went Wrong, What Happened and 
What's Next? INDEPENDENT, https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-
advice/viking-sky-what-happened-storm-norway-emergency-evacuation-coast-
a8837371.html [https://perma.cc/TKJ5-G8W8].   
64 Id.   
65 David Oliver, Five Helicopters, 28 rescuers, 464 saved: Inside the Viking Sky 
Cruise Ship Rescue, USA TODAY, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/cruises/2019/03/28/viking-sky-cruise-
ship-norway-inside-rescue-mission/3298517002/ [https://perma.cc/N69E-34H8].  
66 Calder, supra note 63. 
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shipping activity.”67 This threat exists wherever vessels use, 
transport, or store oil or oil products.68  
 
Oils may be persistent (such as heavy fuel oil)69 or non-
persistent (such as diesel fuels, gasoline, and jet fuel).70 When 
spilled into the marine environment, persistent fuels tend to remain 
recognizable and may spread as an oil slick or strand on the shore.71 
Non-persistent fuels, on the other hand, tend to evaporate or dissolve 
when spilled into the water.72 Both persistent and non-persistent 
fuels are toxic and negatively impact fish and wildlife via multiple 
pathways.73 That said, heavy fuel oil is recognized as particularly 
dangerous if it is spilled, especially in colder waters.74  
 
Ships that carry large volumes of oil and spend longer 
periods of time in a particular region present the largest oil hazard 
exposure for that region.75 In addition, ships using or carrying 
persistent fuels create more hazard exposure than non-persistent 
fuels.76 An analysis of vessel traffic in the Bering Sea concluded that 
large cargo vessels using persistent oil as a fuel for propulsion and 
tankers carrying non-persistent fuel as cargo represented the greatest 
oil spill hazard exposure.77 On the U.S. side of the Bering Strait, 
 
67 AMSA 2009, supra note 60, at 152.  
68 BERING SEA RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 25, at 17.  
69 Id. at 35. 
70 Id. at 19.  
71 Id. When spilled into the marine environment, persistent fuels tend to remain 
recognizable and may spread as an oil slick or strand on the shore. Id. at 20. 
72 Id. at 20. 
73 Id.  
74 Det Norske Veritas, REPORT: HEAVY FUEL OIL IN THE ARCTIC (PHASE 1) 42 
(2011), https://pame.is/index.php/document-library/shipping-documents/heavy-
fuel-oil-documents/359-hfo-in-the-arctic-phase-i/file [https://perma.cc/9DCT-
ZK3K].   
75 See generally BERING SEA RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 25, at 51-54.  
76 See id. at 37 (noting that persistent oil remains in the environment for a longer 
period of time “and thus has the potential to impact biological receptors over a 
longer time than non-persistent oil”).  
77 Id. at 53.  
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these include vessels serving Red Dog mine near Kivalina and 
tankers delivering fuel products to the region.78  
 
Some of the tankers delivering fuel to the region represent a 
particular threat because they transfer their fuel at sea. These large 
tankers sit so deep in the water that they cannot deliver their cargo 
directly to communities. Instead, fuels from these deep-draft tankers 
must be transferred, on open water, into smaller barges that can 
access shallow ports and beaches in Arctic communities.79 This 
process of at-sea fuel transfer is known as “lightering” or “ship-to-
ship transfer.”80 Due to the presence of large volumes of oil in one 
place at one time,81 as well as the inherent risk of transferring oil at 
sea, lightering represents a significant oil spill risk in the region. 
There have been no reported lightering spills off the coast of 
Alaska,82 but oil spills related to lightering have been documented 
in other regions, and the impacts were significant.83 
 
3.  Discharges from Vessels Pollute Arctic Waters 
 
In addition to the risk of accidental oil spills, more vessel 
traffic will likely lead to the discharge of additional pollutants into 
Arctic waters. Vessel discharge is governed by rules at the state, 
national, and international level.84 These laws prevent or 
 
78 Id. at 54. 
79 OVERVIEW OF TANKER LIGHTERING, supra note 24, at 2-3.  
80 Id. at 1. 
81 See id. at 3 (noting the use of large tankers “means that larger volumes of fuel 
may be transported in one place at one time,” even if the overall volume of fuel 
delivered to the region remains relatively stable).  
82 Id. at 19. 
83 See id. (describing spill of heavy fuel oil during a fuel transfer operation in 
San Francisco Bay that impacted ten miles of shoreline, closed fisheries and 
beaches, and resulted in an $850,000 natural resources damage assessment). 
84 See, e.g., Melissa Parks et al., Quantifying and mitigating three major vessel 
waste streams in the northern Bering Sea, 106 MARINE POLICY 1, 8 (2019) 
(noting international, national, and state level options for area-based mitigation 
measures to reduce discharge), available at 
https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S0308597X18308315?token=B5CFC92
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significantly restrict ships from discharging many types of 
pollutants, such as oil and oil mixtures and noxious liquids and 
chemicals.85 However, there are more lenient restrictions on the 
intentional discharge of sewage,86 and even fewer restrictions on the 
intentional discharge of graywater (i.e., drainage water from 
showers, dishwashers, sinks, laundry machines, and similar 
facilities).87  
 
Discharge of untreated sewage and graywater can spread 
bacteria or viruses,88 which can lead to illness in people who 
consume marine-based foods.89 This is particularly problematic in 
the Arctic, where fish and marine mammals often constitute a 
significant part of the diet for many people.90 Importantly, graywater 
is not necessarily “cleaner” than sewage; concentrations of fecal 
coliform in untreated vessel graywater can be up to several orders 
 
70945ED9C4A5B69B5574668940272C1B29B40795062BFC7620C622917253
856A6C164E694F2DD317D7F9BC404 [https://perma.cc/M73H-RS8U].  
85 See, e.g., Int’l Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as 
amended by Protocol of 1978, Annexes I, II, & III (Feb. 16, 1978) [hereinafter 
MARPOL]. 
86 Int’l Maritime Org., Prevention of Pollution by Sewage from Ships (undated), 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/Sewage/Pag
es/Default.aspx, [https://perma.cc/ZNW7-2DMY] (describing international 
standard that allows ships to discharge raw sewage so long as the discharge 
occurs at a distance of at least twelve nautical miles from shore and traveling at 
least four knots). 
87 See, e.g., Parks et al., supra note 84, at 4–6 (noting that IMO instruments such 
as MARPOL and the Polar Code do not “specifically address grey water or 
restrict its discharge”).  
88 See, id. at 4 (noting fecal coliform from discharged sewage presents an 
ecosystem risk; also noting that graywater contains fecal coliform 
concentrations similar to those found in raw sewage); see also Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, CRUISE SHIP DISCHARGE ASSESSMENT REPORT SECTION 3: 
GRAYWATER 3-6 (2008) (noting presence of pathogens in untreated graywater 
samples) (hereinafter CRUISE SHIP DISCHARGE REPORT). 
89 See, Parks et al., supra note 84, at 4 (noting that “[s]hellfish can concentrate 
fecal coliform and associated pathogens from the water around them, which can 
be passed to humans”). 
90 See, e.g., Oceana & Kawerak, Inc., supra note 5, at 18–22 (describing the 
importance of subsistence foods to Indigenous people of the Bering Strait 
region). 
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of magnitude higher than untreated domestic wastewater.91 
Discharges of sewage and graywater can also lead to oxygen 
depletion and can increase nutrient levels, possibly contributing to 
toxic algal blooms and eutrophication, the effects of which can 
ripple through marine food webs.92  
 
Discharge of sewage and graywater from large passenger 
vessels is a special concern.93 Large passenger ships, such as cruise 
ships, discharge significant volumes of sewage and graywater, 
averaging nearly 8.5 gallons per day per person for sewage and 
between forty-five and sixty-five gallons per day per person for 
graywater.94 With cruise vessel tourism expected to increase 
significantly in polar waters, discharges from cruise ships and other 
large passenger vessels are a significant threat to the Arctic marine 
environment.95 Even if stronger restrictions on discharge are 
imposed, enforcement will be critical:  some cruise companies have 
a well-documented record of noncompliance with anti-pollution 
regulations.96 
 
91 CRUISE SHIP DISCHARGE REPORT, supra note 88, at 3-6. 
92 Id. at 2-33, 3-27. 
93 See Parks et al., supra note 84, at 4 (noting that “passenger vessels carry 
significantly more people and generate more sewage and grey water than . . . 
other vessel types”). 
94CRUISE SHIP DISCHARGE REPORT, supra note 88, at 2-2, Figure 2.1 and 3-3. 
95 See, e.g., Ahmasuk, Austin, Local Concerns of Opening the Arctic and the 
Crystal Serenity, OCEAN CURRENTS: OCEAN CONSERVANCY BLOG (Sept. 8, 
2016), https://oceanconservancy.org/blog/2016/09/08/local-concerns-of-
opening-the-arctic-and-the-crystal-serenity/ [https://perma.cc/N8G3-HAJ4]. 
96 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Princess Cruise Lines 
to Pay Largest-Ever Criminal Penalty for Deliberate Vessel Pollution: 
Company to Pay $40 Million and Implement Remedial Measures on All 
Carnival Companies Visiting U.S. Ports (Dec. 1, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/princess-cruise-lines-pay-largest-ever-criminal-
penalty-deliberate-vessel-pollution, [https://perma.cc/MKH6-TLH8] (noting that 
the “Carnival family of companies has a documented history of environmental 
violations”); see also, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Princess 
Cruise Lines and its Parent Company Plead Guilty to Environmental Probation 
Violations, Ordered to Pay $20 Million Criminal Penalty (June 3, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/princess-cruise-lines-and-its-parent-company-
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4.  Emissions from Vessels Adversely Affect Arctic Air Quality 
and Contribute to Global Warming 
 
Increased vessel traffic also presents risks from emissions 
into the air. Most vessels are powered by engines that run on fossil 
fuels including heavy fuel oil, distillates, or fuel blends. Combustion 
of these fuels emits pollutants that contribute to climate change. In 
addition to emitting carbon dioxide, ships’ engines produce 
particulate matter including black carbon. Black carbon has 
significant climate forcing impacts.97 In the Arctic, black carbon is 
deposited on ice and snow where it decreases reflectivity, increases 
heat absorption, and accelerates melting.98 Although black carbon 
does not persist in the atmosphere as long as carbon dioxide, it is the 
second-biggest contributor to anthropogenic climate change after 
carbon dioxide.99 Ships also emit sulfur and nitrogen oxides, which 
 
plead-guilty-environmental-probation-violations, [https://perma.cc/5F58-6GMS]  
(noting violations of probation); Taylor Dolven, Federal judge threatens to 
temporarily block Carnival ships from docking at U.S. ports, MIAMI HERALD 
(Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/tourism-
cruises/article229069589.html (noting that one of Carnival Cruise lines’ ships 
illegally dumped graywater in Glacier Bay National Park in Alaska).  
97 See, e.g., Climate risks from CO2 and short-lived climate pollutants, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., (undated), https://www.who.int/sustainable-
development/housing/health-risks/climate-pollutants/en/, 
[https://perma.cc/PA8N-D68K] (noting that black carbon, while short-lived in 
the atmosphere, “has hundreds to thousands of times more warming potential 
than carbon dioxide.”). 
98 See, e.g., P.K. Quinn et al., The Impact of Black Carbon on Arctic Climate, 
ARCTIC MONITORING & ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, 45–49 (2011), 
https://www.amap.no/documents/download/977/inline. 
99 See T.C. Bond et al., Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: 
A scientific assessment, 118 J. of Geophysical Res.: Atmospheres, 5380, 5381 
(2013) (“We estimate that black carbon . . . is the second most important human 
emission in terms of its climate forcing in the present-day atmosphere; only 
carbon 
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can have adverse impacts on human health.100 Ships that burn heavy 
fuel oil tend to produce even “dirtier” exhaust because contaminants 
in the fuel—such as ash, sulfur, vanadium, aluminum, silicon, 
sodium, sediment, and asphaltenes—negatively affect the 
composition of exhaust.101   
 
Arctic shipping emissions have direct consequences on 
human health and the environment in the Arctic and contribute 
significantly to global emissions and climate change. Global 
shipping traffic is responsible for roughly 2.2% of global carbon 
dioxide emissions.102 If the shipping industry were a country, its 
worldwide emissions would rank approximately sixth, falling 
between Germany and Japan.103 Experts predict that on a business-
as-usual pathway, total shipping emissions could reach 17% of 
worldwide greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.104  
 
 
100 Airclim et al., AIR POLLUTION FROM SHIPS 3 (2011), 
http://www.cleanshipping.org/download/111128_Air%20pollution%20from%20
ships_New_Nov-11(3).pdf [https://perma.cc/5546-6UKQ] 
101 Vard Marine, FUEL ALTERNATIVES FOR ARCTIC SHIPPING 10-11 (2015), 
http://awsassets.wwf.ca/downloads/vard_313_000_01_fuel_alternatives_letter_f
inal.pdf  
102 Int’l Maritime Org., THIRD IMO GREENHOUSE GAS STUDY 2014, EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 1 (2014), 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution
/Documents/Third%20Greenhouse%20Gas%20Study/GHG3%20Executive%20
Summary%20and%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HFE6-3A96].  
103 Zoe Schlanger, Smoggy Seas: If shipping were a country, it would be the 
world’s sixth-biggest greenhouse gas emitter, QUARTZ (April 17, 2018), 
https://qz.com/1253874/if-shipping-were-a-country-it-would-the-worlds-sixth-
biggest-greenhouse-gas-emitter/, [https://perma.cc/NRB2-WKT9] 
104 See European Parliament Directorate-Gen. for Internal Policies, Emission 
Reduction Targets for International Aviation and Shipping 28 (2015), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/569964/IPOL_STU
(2015)569964_EN.pdf, [https://perma.cc/42BF-LHKT] (explaining that “if 
action to combat climate change is further postponed,” the maritime transport 
sector’s contribution to global carbon dioxide emissions may reach 17% by 
2050). 
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5.   Additional Subsea Noise from Vessels May Adversely Affect 
Marine Animals and Subsistence Hunting 
 
Increasing vessel traffic generally leads to more noise in the 
ocean, which can have serious impacts on marine mammals and fish. 
In the water, low-frequency sound energy—like that used by baleen 
whales—travels faster and further than light energy105 and can easily 
travel long distances and cross maritime jurisdictional borders.106 
Researchers documented changes to humpback whale vocalizations 
in response to anthropogenic sound sources roughly 200 kilometers 
away.107 In the past, Arctic waters have been relatively free of 
anthropogenic noise. In recent years, however, the Arctic is 
experiencing more underwater noise caused by vessel traffic as well 
as military sonar, seismic exploration for oil and gas, and resource 
extraction.108 With respect to vessel traffic, icebreakers tend to 
produce louder and more varied sounds than other vessels.109 
 
Increased noise in the subsea environment may adversely 
affect marine mammals, which use sound to communicate, avoid 
predators, and navigate their environment.110 Anthropogenic noise 
can disturb important behaviors like feeding, breeding, resting, or 
migration.111 Exposure to low-frequency sound “may be associated 
 
105 ROBERT J. URICK, PRINCIPLES OF UNDERWATER SOUND 1 (3rd ed. 1983). 
106 See, e.g., Sue E. Moore et al., A new framework for assessing the effects of 
anthropogenic sound on marine mammals in a rapidly changing Arctic, 62 
Bioscience 289, 290 (2012) (noting sound from seismic surveys has been 
detected thousands of kilometers from its source). 
107 Denise Risch et al., Changes in Humpback Whale Song Occurrence in 
Response to an Acoustic Source 200km Away, 7 PLoSONE e29741, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3256173/pdf/pone.0029741.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CT44-95QT]. 
108 Sue E. Moore et al., supra note 106, at 289-292. 
109 AMSA 2009, supra note 60, at 146. 
110 Moore et al., supra note 106, at 290. 
111 Id. 
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with chronic stress in whales,”112 and human-caused noise may 
reduce the availability of prey species.113 Emerging evidence 
suggests that subsea noise may adversely affect fish, squid, and 
other marine animals.114 To the extent that marine mammals are 
adversely affected by underwater noise, opportunities for 
subsistence hunting may also be adversely affected. For instance, 
sound from vessels may cause marine mammals to divert from their 
usual migration pathways, which could make hunting those animals 
more difficult or dangerous.115 
 
6.  Increased Ship Traffic May Increase Ship Strikes 
 
In the Arctic, ships share the water with marine mammals 
including large whales, creating the potential for ship strikes that can 
injure or kill these whales.116 The Bering Strait region could be an 
especially important region in this regard, because the strait is 
relatively narrow and the fall migration of whales overlaps with 
periods of higher vessel traffic in this narrow passage.117 Many 
 
112 Rosalind M. Rolland et al., Evidence that ship noise increases stress in right 
whales, 279 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B 2363, 2365–67 (2012), 
https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rspb.2011.2429 
[https://perma.cc/KMS7-GPZP].  
113 Moore et al., supra note 106, at 290. 
114 J. Gedamke et al., Ocean Noise Strategy Roadmap, NOAA 99–102 (2016), 
https://cetsound.noaa.gov/Assets/cetsound/documents/Roadmap/ONS_Roadmap
_Final_Complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C3Y-LC2G].  
115 Huntington et al., Vessels, risks and rules: planning for safe shipping in the 
Bering Strait, 51 MARINE POLICY 119, 122 (2015). See also Hannah Hoag, Inuit 
concerns stall seismic testing: Research in Canadian waters halted over fears it 
could harm wildlife, NATURE (Aug. 12, 2010) (describing how Inuit group 
concerns that seismic testing could “disturb narwhals, beluga, walrus, seals and 
polar bears in Lancaster Sound”), 
https://www.nature.com/news/2010/100812/full/news.2010.403.html 
[https://perma.cc/X265-FGAV]. 
116 Huntington et al., supra note 115, at 121. 
117 Id. 
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species of large whales are susceptible to ship strikes118 and in this 
region, bowhead whales may be most vulnerable.119 In addition to 
whale mortality from ship strikes, some observers have raised the 
concern that a large vessel could strike subsistence hunters in small 
skiffs.120 
 
7.  Additional Vessel Traffic Creates More Pathways for 
Marine Invasive Species 
 
Ship traffic is a major contributor to the spread of invasive 
species—organisms introduced by human activity into an 
environment outside of their natural range and that spread to have 
negative impacts on the local ecosystem.121 Ships may spread non-
native species when they take on ballast water containing marine 
organisms in one location and discharge that ballast water and its 
associated marine organisms in another location.122 Ships may also 
spread non-native species when those species attach themselves to 
 
118 See, e.g., David W. Laist et al., Collisions Between Ships and Whales, 17 
MARINE MAMMAL SCI. 35, 39 (2001) (finding evidence of ship strikes among 
eleven species of great whales). 
119 Huntington et al., supra note 115, at 121. See also AMSA 2009, supra note 
57, at 108 (listing ship strikes as a potential conflict between increasing vessel 
traffic and indigenous marine resource use in the Bering Strait region). 
120 See id. at 122 (noting that Indigenous hunters travel as much as 100 miles 
from shore in small open boats that “could be struck by a large vessel or 
swamped by a large vessel's wake,” and that “[g]iven the cold water and 
distance from land and assistance in the Bering Strait region, such incidents 
would likely be fatal to those on the small boat, if the large vessel were unaware 
of the accident.”). 
121 Biofouling, INT’L MARITIME ORG., 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Biofouling/Pages/default.aspx, 
[https://perma.cc/B226-QRZQ] (“The problem of invasive species carried by 
ships has intensified over the last few decades due to the expanded trade and 
traffic volume and, since the volumes of seaborne trade continue to increase, the 
problem may not yet have reached its peak.”). See also Invasive Species, IUCN, 
https://www.iucn.org/theme/species/our-work/invasive-species/, 
[https://perma.cc/HS66-LRN6] (defining invasive species).   
122 Ballast Water Management, INT’L MARITIME ORG., 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/BallastWaterManagement/Pages/
Default.aspx, [https://perma.cc/6AGV-DKXX].   
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the outside of a vessel in one location and are carried by the ship to 
another location (“hull-fouling” or “biofouling”).123 Invasive 
species can transform marine habitats and cause significant 
economic impacts, including diminishing fisheries.124 Once 
invasive species are established in marine habitats, “it can be nearly 
impossible to eliminate them.”125 Modelers predict Arctic waters 
will have the largest rate of species invasion, with a modeled 
invasion intensity of nearly five and a half times the global marine 
average.126 Researchers posited that relatively “low initial species 
richness” in the Arctic led to “high biodiversity impact” in polar 
regions.127 With respect to invasive species transmitted by vessels, 
risk is highest where ships travel routes that join seas with similar 
environments, such as the Northern Sea Route, which connects the 
North Pacific and the North Atlantic.128 
 
IV. STEPS FORWARD: ADVANCES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF 
ARCTIC VESSEL TRAFFIC SINCE 2012 
 
Stakeholders and regulators have already taken important 
steps to mitigate threats posed by increasing vessel traffic in the 
 
123 Int’l Maritime Org., Biofouling,  
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Biofouling/Pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2019) [https://perma.cc/B226-QRZQ].  
124 Jennifer L. Molnar, Rebecca Gamboa, Carmen Revenga & Mark Spaulding, 
Assessing the global threat of invasive species to marine biodiversity, 6 
FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & THE ENV’T, 485, 485 (2008), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d0be/4fa91c637e06175f158251f11837e4a40cfa
.pdf [https://perma.cc/VNL3-ZVVM].  
125 Id. at 485. 
126 William W.L. Cheung, Vicky W. Y. Lam, Jorge L. Sarmiento, Kelly 
Kearney, Reg Watson & Daniel Pauly, Projecting global marine biodiversity 
impacts under climate change scenarios, 10 FISH & FISHERIES 235, 243 (2009). 
127 Id. at 243. 
128 Chris Ware Jørgen Berge, Anders Jelmert, Steffen M. Olsen, Loïc Pelliser, 
Mary Wisz, Darren Kriticos, Georgy Semenov, Slowomir Kwashieski & Inger 
G. Alsos, Biological introduction risks from shipping in a warming Arctic, 53 J. 
OF APPLIED ECOLOGY 340, 347 (2015), 
https://besjournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1365-2664.12566 
[https://perma.cc/LX8R-T5HG].  
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Arctic. The following section summarizes measures, implemented 
since 2012, intended to increase safety and reduce environmental 
impacts associated with vessel traffic in Arctic waters. It also 
discusses additional mitigation measures under active consideration 
and in one case, a suite of measures that was rescinded before it 
could be implemented. 
A.  The International Maritime Organization Adopted a 
New Polar Code 
 
One of the biggest developments in Arctic shipping 
regulation since 2012 has been implementation of the International 
Maritime Organization’s (IMO) International Code for Ships 
Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), which began in January 
2017.129 The Polar Code establishes provisions designed to increase 
safety and reduce environmental impacts of ship traffic in high-
latitude waters, including Arctic waters. Like other IMO 
conventions, the Polar Code is enforced by individual nations, 
including the nation under which a vessel is registered (i.e., the “flag 
state”) and nations where the vessel makes port calls (via “port-state 
control”). Various parts of the shipping industry itself—including 
insurance providers and classification societies—also help enforce 
the Polar Code and other IMO mitigation measures. 
 
The Polar Code’s environmental provisions include 
pollution restrictions above and beyond those that apply in non-
polar waters. These include additional restrictions on the discharge 
of oil, noxious liquid substances, harmful substances, sewage, and 
garbage.130 Likewise, the Polar Code’s safety provisions include 
 
129 Int’l Maritime Org., Shipping in polar waters—Adoption of an international 
code for safety for ships operating in polar waters (Polar Code), 
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Pages/default.aspx, 
[https://perma.cc/UYF7-3NNG] (last visited Nov. 1 2019) (noting Polar Code 
entered into force January 1, 2017). 
130 Int’l Maritime Org., International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, 
part II-A, ch. 1–5, MEPC 68/21/Add.1 (Nov. 21, 2014) 
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special requirements related to ship design and construction, 
equipment, operating and training requirements, communications, 
voyage planning, and other elements designed to improve safety of 
vessels in high-latitude waters.131 Sometimes safety and 
environmental protection measures blend together. For example, 
voyage planning provisions are categorized under safety, but require 
mariners to consider information that could help minimize impacts 
to marine mammals, such as location of marine mammal 
aggregation and seasonal migration areas.132 Mariners and other 
stakeholders are working to determine how best to apply these 
mandatory marine mammal voyage planning provisions in U.S. 
Arctic waters. 
 
Adoption of the Polar Code was a significant step forward, 
but it did not resolve all challenges related to vessel traffic in high-
latitude waters. The Polar Code’s safety provisions, for example, do 
not apply to fishing vessels, smaller cargo ships, pleasure yachts, 
military vessels and other less common vessel types.133 Its 
environmental provisions do not regulate discharge of graywater 




WFD6](hereinafter Polar Code).  
131 Id. at part I-A; ch. 1–12, 
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Documents/POLAR%20C
ODE%20TEXT%20AS%20ADOPTED.pdf.[ https://perma.cc/57Z4-WFD6],\.  
132 Id. at part I-A, ch. 11.3.6. 
133 The Polar Code’s safety provisions apply only to vessels subject to the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). See DNV-GL, 
The IMO Polar Code in force, beginning 1 January 2017: How to comply (Dec. 
21, 2016), https://www.dnvgl.com/news/the-imo-polar-code-in-force-beginning-
1-january-2017-how-to-comply-83230, [https://perma.cc/D3Y2-J7V5]. SOLAS 
does not apply to certain types of smaller vessels. International Martime 
Organization, Int’l Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (as amended) 
(SOLAS), Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 1226, Ch. 1 Part A, Reg. 3 (listing vessels 
to which SOLAS does not apply).  
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waters.134 The Polar Code does little to address impacts from vessel-
related noise or the threat of invasive species in Arctic waters. While 
it sets forth broad management measures for polar waters, it does 
not impose granular area-based management measures such as 
specific vessel routing measures or specific areas where discharges 
or emissions should be subject to more stringent regulations. In 
short, while adoption of the Polar Code was a positive development, 
it is not the final word on management of vessel traffic in Arctic 
waters. 
 
B.  IMO Approved New Areas to be Avoided and Traffic 
Routes Around the Aleutian Islands and in the Bering 
Strait, and Additional Measures are Under 
Consideration 
 
In U.S. Arctic waters, several routing measures have been 
implemented since 2012 and others are underway. Routing 
measures include, among other things, different types of formal 
vessel traffic lanes as well as “Areas to be Avoided” (ATBAs). As 
the name implies, ATBA designation encourages vessels to steer 
clear of defined areas to avoid navigational hazards or to safeguard 
environmentally sensitive areas.135  
 
134 The Polar Code encourages mariners to discontinue use of heavy fuel oil in 
the Arctic but does not require them to do so. See Polar Code, Part II-B, Ch. 1.1.  
135 Int’l Maritime Org., General Provisions on Ships’ Routeing, § 2.1.12 
(defining “area to be avoided” as “a routeing measure comprising an area within 
defined limits in which either navigation is particularly hazardous or it is 
exceptionally important to avoid casualties and which should be avoided by all 
ships, or certain classes of ship”). See also Int’l Maritime Org., Guidance Note 
on the Preparation of Proposals on Ships’ Routeing Systems and Ship Reporting 
Systems for Submission to the Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation, § 1.2 
(2003) (noting that ships routeing measures may be used to “increase the 




ipsRouteingReporting.pdf, [https://perma.cc/363R-W8JF].  
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Waters surrounding the Aleutian Islands—in the southern 
Bering Sea and North Pacific—were the first in the U.S. Arctic to 
benefit from routing measures. The IMO approved five ATBAs in 
the region, which took effect at the beginning of 2016.136 After 
establishment of the five ATBAs in waters surrounding the Aleutian 
Islands, attention turned to the Bering Strait region.  
 
In 2010, the U.S. Coast Guard embarked on a maritime 
planning process, called a Port Access Route Study (PARS), to 
determine whether the Bering Strait region might benefit from 
formal vessel traffic lanes.137 Toward the conclusion of that process 
in 2016, the Coast Guard recommended designating formal vessel 
traffic lanes and specific ATBAs in the region.138 In 2018, those 
recommendations bore fruit when the IMO approved a joint 
proposal from the United States and Russia to designate 
recommendatory two-way vessel routes that extend well south, and 
slightly north, of the Bering Strait itself.139 The routes are safe for 
 
136 North of England P&I Assn., Ltd., USA: IMO Adopt the Establishment of five 
‘Areas to Be Avoided’ (ATBA) in the Aleutian Islands (June 25, 2015), 
http://www.nepia.com/insights/industry-news/usa-imo-adopt-the-establishment-
of-five-%E2%80%98areas-to-be-avoided%E2%80%99-(atba)-in-the-aleutian-
islands/, [https://perma.cc/F5XG-Y6Y3]. See also Int’l Maritime Org., Sub-
committee on Navigation, Communication and Search and Rescue, Routeing 
Measures and Mandatory Ship Reporting Systems: Establishment of five areas 
to be avoided in the region of the Aleutian Islands, Submitted by the United 




137 See generally, U.S. Coast Guard, Port Access Route Study: In the Bering 
Strait, 75 Fed. Reg. 68, 568 (Nov. 8, 2010) (announcing vessel routing study for 
the Bering Strait region and requesting public comment). 
138 U.S. Coast Guard, Preliminary Findings: Port Access Route Study: In the 
Chukchi Sea, Bering Strait, and Bering Sea, 22-36 (Dec. 23, 2017), 
https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/pdf/PARS/Bering_Strait_PARS_General.pdf, 
[https://perma.cc/MD6B-89BY] (hereinafter Preliminary Findings).  
139 The Maritime Executive, IMO Authorizes New Bering Sea Routing (May 26, 
2018), https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/imo-authorizes-new-bering-
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all types of vessels and are designed to keep ships away from 
potentially hazardous coastlines and shoaling waters.140 
Encouraging ships to follow these routes improves predictability 
and safety and enhances environmental protection.141 In addition to 
the establishment of these two-way routes, the IMO also designated 
three ATBAs in the Bering Strait region in 2018; one each around 
St. Lawrence, Nunavik, and King islands.142 The United States 
proposed these Bering Strait-region ATBAs to help improve 
shipping safety, protect the marine environment, and safeguard 
subsistence activities.143 
 
Beyond the ATBAs designated in 2018, officials from the 
United States and Russia have discussed the potential for the two 
countries to jointly propose a transboundary ATBA designed to 
improve safety and protect waters around Big and Little Diomede 
 
sea-routing, [https://perma.cc/76YE-QKHQ]. See also Int’l Maritime Org. Sub-
committee on Navigation, Communication and Search and Rescue, Routeing 
Measures and Mandatory Ship Reporting Systems: Establishment of two-way 
routes and precautionary areas in the Bering Sea and Bering Strait, Submitted 
by the Russian Federation and the United States §§ 3.5 & 8.5 (Nov. 17, 2017) 
(describing joint U.S. and Russian proposal for vessel traffic lanes), 
https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/pdf/IMO/NCSR_5_3_7.pdf, 
[https://perma.cc/Q6WJ-EC7X].  
140 Id.  
141 Id. at § 3. 
142 See Int’l Maritime Org., Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communications and 
Search and Rescue (NCSR), 5th session, February 19-23, 2018, (Feb. 23, 2018), 
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/NCSR/Pages/NCSR5.a
spx, [https://perma.cc/D6GA-VQ3Q] (noting subcommittee’s agreement to 
“establish three areas to be avoided in the Bering Sea, proposed by the United 
States, to improve safety of navigation and protect the fragile and unique 
environment”). The United States originally proposed a substantially bigger 
ATBA that would have encompassed a large area south of St. Lawrence Island. 
The IMO subcommittee that evaluated the proposal opted not to include these 
southern waters when it approved the St. Lawrence Island ATBA because some 
subcommittee members felt that it was inappropriate to designate such a large 
area in the absence of more direct concerns about navigation and ship safety. 
143 Henry Huntington et al., The role of areas to be avoided in the governance of 
shipping in the greater Bering Strait region, MARINE POLICY § 4.3 (May 2019), 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2019.103564, [https://perma.cc/VR35-WLZ6]. 
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Islands, which are located in the middle of the Bering Strait.144 Big 
Diomede Island is part of Russia and Little Diomede Island is part 
of the United States. The United States Coast Guard went as far as 
recommending designation of an ATBA around Little Diomede 
Island in 2016.145 However, instead of moving forward with a 
unilateral proposal at the IMO, the United States opted to explore 
the potential of a joint Russian/U.S. ATBA that would surround both 
Diomede Islands. As of this writing, discussions between the U.S. 
and Russia are still ongoing. 
 
In late 2018, the U.S. Coast Guard announced the start of a 
new PARS for the Alaskan Arctic Coast, covering U.S. portions of 
the Chukchi and Beaufort seas.146 In undertaking the study, the 
Coast Guard plans to “analyze current vessel patterns, predict future 
vessel needs and balance the needs of all waterway users by 
developing and recommending vessel routing measures for the 
Arctic coast.”147 While the Coast Guard expects to take more than 
four years to complete the Alaskan Arctic Coast PARS,148 the 
process could eventually lead to the creation of ATBAs adjacent to 
the Chukchi and Beaufort Sea coasts, designated traffic lanes to 
guide large vessels as they pass through the region, and/or additional 
mitigation measures designed to increase safety and minimize 
impacts to the marine ecosystem and subsistence hunting.149 The 
PARS process gives Indigenous residents of Arctic communities 
and other stakeholders an opportunity to contribute input that may 
help shape the study and any recommended outcomes.150 
 
144 Id. at 6. 
145 Preliminary Findings, supra note 138, at 22, 30-31. 
146 Port Access Route Study: Alaskan Arctic Coast, 83 Fed. Reg. 65,701, 65,701 
(Dec. 21, 2018). 
147 Id. at 65,702. 
148 Id.  
149 See id. (noting that the Coast Guard is undertaking the study in part to 
develop and recommend vessel routing measures for the Arctic coast). 
150 See id. at 65,701 (requesting public comment) and 65,702 (noting that the 
study may take more than four years in part because of challenges related to 
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C.  Stakeholders Formed New Non-Regulatory Bodies, 
Including the Best Practices Information Forum and 
Two Waterways Safety Councils 
 
Over the past five years, maritime stakeholders established 
new voluntary, non-regulatory bodies to gather and disseminate 
information related to shipping in Arctic waters which have 
relevance to the Bering Strait. These new bodies include the Arctic 
Shipping Best Practices Information Forum, the Arctic Waterways 
Safety Committee, and the Aleutian Island Waterways Safety 
Committee. 
 
The Arctic Shipping Best Practices Information Forum was 
formed in 2017 in an effort to help implement the Polar Code.151 The 
Forum is designed to heighten awareness of Polar Code provisions 
among those mariners who operate in Arctic waters, as well as 
others who may be affected by maritime operations in the Arctic.152 
The Forum also works to promote “the exchange of information and 
best practices between the Forum participants on specific shipping 
topics, including but not limited to; hydrography, search and rescue 
logistics, industry guidelines and ship equipment, systems and 
structure.”153 The Best Practices Information Forum developed as a 
project of the Arctic Council’s Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment (PAME) working group. Participation in the Forum “is 
open to Arctic States, Permanent Participants and Arctic Council 
Observers,” as well as other professional organizations that have 
 
“accessing and communicating with regional stakeholders at times when 
discussions will be most productive.”). 
151 Prot. of the Arctic Marine Env’t Working Grp., The Arctic Shipping Best 
Practice Information Forum (undated), 
https://www.pame.is/index.php/projects/arctic-marine-shipping/the-arctic-
shipping-best-practices-information-forum (last visited Aug. 27, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/NP6A-HH7X].  
152 Id.  
153 Id.  
2020] Safety Measures in the Bering Strait Region 97 
 
relevant expertise and experience and that work to promote shipping 
safety and protection of the marine environment in the Arctic.154 To 
date, the Forum has served primarily as a venue for information 
sharing; in the future, it may evolve to serve additional functions.  
 
In addition to the Arctic Shipping Best Practices Information 
Forum, which covers the global Arctic, maritime users have 
established two voluntary, multi-stakeholder groups that focus on 
waters off the coast of Alaska. The Arctic Waterway Safety 
Committee was established in 2014 and covers U.S. portions of the 
Beaufort and Chukchi seas, as well as the Bering Strait and northern 
Bering Sea.155 The Aleutian Islands Waterways Safety Committee 
was established in 2017 and covers U.S. waters around the Aleutian 
Islands chain and the southern portion of the Bering Sea, including 
waters around the Pribilof Islands.156 The two committees are 
modeled after Harbor Safety Committees that operate in various 
marine areas in the lower 48 states.157 They facilitate exchange of 
information and establishment and dissemination of best practices 
and standards of care relevant to their regions. This is in an effort to 
promote safety, protect the marine environment, and reduce 
conflicts among maritime users.158 While the two committees are 
 
154 Id.  
155 Our Work, ARCTIC WATERWAYS SAFETY COMM., 
http://www.arcticwaterways.org/attorneys-1.html [https://perma.cc/FX9L-
PTLR].  
156 About, ALEUTIAN ISLANDS WATERWAYS SAFETY COMM.  
157 See generally U.S. Coast Guard, NAVIGATION AND VESSEL INSPECTION 
CIRCULAR NO. 1-00: GUIDANCE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF HARBOR SAFETY COMMITTEES UNDER THE MARINE TRANSPORTATION 
SYSTEM (MTS) INITIATIVE (undated), (describing Harbor Safety Committees). 
158 See Our Work, ARCTIC WATERWAYS SAFETY COMM., 
http://www.arcticwaterways.org/attorneys-1.html, [https://perma.cc/FX9L-
PTLR].  (describing mission of Arctic Waterways Safety Committee); see also 
Aleutian Islands Waterways Safety Comm., ALEUTIAN ISLANDS WATERWAYS 
SAFETY PLAN 5 (May 2019), 
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/cd25fe_0f4f7dff15fb429c8b26dd4456d3f05b.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SXW7-A7UH] (describing purpose and mission of Aleutian 
Islands Waterways Safety Committee). 
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structured somewhat differently, both include members representing 
a wide range of maritime sectors and stakeholders, including various 
commercial shipping operators and subsistence or Alaska Native 
interests.159 Representatives from federal, state and local agencies 
participate in and support the work of both Committees.160  
 
The two Alaskan waterways safety committees are forums 
in which waterway users can identify concerns and work toward 
collaborative, non-regulatory solutions. For instance, the Arctic 
Waterways Safety Committee focused on reducing conflicts 
between Indigenous hunters and researchers operating in Arctic 
waters, eventually developing and adopting a standard of care for 
research vessels.161 While the research vessel standard of care is 
non-binding, it has been adopted by at least some Arctic 
researchers.162 The Aleutian Islands Waterways Safety Committee 
recently developed and adopted a “Waterways Safety Plan” with 
standards of care and protocols which “are intended to complement 




159 Membership, ARCTIC WATERWAYS SAFETY COMM., 
http://www.arcticwaterways.org/membership.html, [https://perma.cc/GC9Z-
DR7R]; see also Organization Framework & Biographies, ALEUTIAN ISLANDS 
WATERWAYS SAFETY COMM., https://www.aleutianislandswsc.org/membership-
framework, [https://perma.cc/KH7M-5MYU] (describing membership structure 
of committees). Co-author Andrew Hartsig is a member of the Aleutian Island 
Waterways Safety Committee representing conservation organizations. 
160 Id. 
161 See generally Arctic Waterways Safety Comm., WATERWAYS SAFETY PLAN 
PART 3 (Dec. 5, 2018),  http://www.arcticwaterways.org/safety-plan.html, 
[https://perma.cc/R73M-T3YS].  
162 Ian Evans, Avoiding Clashes Between Ocean Researchers and Indigenous 




163 ALEUTIAN ISLANDS WATERWAYS SAFETY PLAN, supra note 155, at 5. 
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While development of these two safety committees 
represents a step forward, opportunities for improvements remain. 
The structure of the Arctic Waterways Safety Committee, for 
example, has been criticized for not adequately including Tribes, 
and an important regional tribal organization recently withdrew 
from participating in the Committee for this reason.164 As the 
Committee continues to evolve, it should consider changing its 
membership structure to ensure relevant Tribes are properly 
represented. 
 
D.  The Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area Was 
Established – And Then Revoked 
 
In 2016, after years of work by Indigenous communities, 
President Obama signed an Executive Order creating the Northern 
Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area (NBSCRA).165 The Executive 
Order set aside the Northern Bering Sea region as a unique place, 
home to rich peoples and cultures, and in need of a special 
governance structure and protections. It created a mandate for 
federal agencies working in the region to coordinate with one 
another and to give attention to the “rights, needs and knowledge” 
of Alaska Native Tribes in the region as well as the “delicate and 
unique” ecosystem.166 It also created a Federal Bering Task Force to 
facilitate coordination between federal agencies and a Bering Sea 
Intergovernmental Tribal Advisory Council to provide input to the 
Task Force on behalf of Alaska Native Tribes.167  
 
The Executive Order contained specific directives aimed at 
various industries that could adversely affect ecological values or 
 
164 See Letter from Kawerak, Inc. to Willie Goodwin, Chairman, Arctic 
Waterways Safety Committee (Jan. 23, 2019) (on file with author). 
165 See generally Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience, Exec. Order No. 
13754 of Dec. 9, 2016, 81 Fed. Reg. 90,669, 90,669–74 (Dec. 14, 2016).  
166 Id. at 90,669. 
167 Id. at 90,670–71. 
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opportunities for subsistence hunting and fishing in the region. 
These included a permanent withdrawal of the region from oil and 
gas development168 and reinforcement of an existing fishing 
measure that closes the region to bottom trawling.169 The Executive 
Order also required all federal agencies to consider traditional 
knowledge in decision-making, and directed additional work to 
address pollution from vessels, consider routing measures for ships, 
and bolster oil spill preparedness.170  
 
President Trump revoked the Executive Order soon after he 
took into office,171 so the Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience 
Area no longer exists as such. It could, however, be reinstated and 
still serves as a potential model for coordinated management that 
includes a substantial role for Indigenous People. 
 
V. LOOKING AHEAD: ADDITIONAL MANAGEMENT MEASURES ARE 
NEEDED TO SAFEGUARD THE ARCTIC FROM THE IMPACTS OF 
INCREASING VESSEL TRAFFIC AND RAPID CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
As the foregoing sections show, there has been progress in 
implementing regulations, adopting recommendatory measures, and 
establishing forums designed to promote better vessel traffic 
practices, both in Arctic waters broadly and in the U.S. Arctic and 
Bering Strait region in particular. Although short-lived, the Northern 
Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area was a notable attempt to 
develop an entirely new governance structure that would address 
concerns related to growing vessel traffic and impacts from other 
 
168 Id. at 90,670. 
169 Id. at 90,672 
170 Id. at 90,671–72.   
171 Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy, Exec. Order 
13795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,816, 20,816–18 (May 3, 2017). President Trump’s 
reversal of the Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area underscores the 
vulnerability of executive orders, which are easily reversed by future Presidents. 
The use of an Executive Order to create the Northern Bering Sea Climate 
Resilience Area also highlights the lack of other mechanisms that could 
accommodate the formation of this unique governance structure. 
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sectors while amplifying the role Indigenous Peoples play in the 
management of the Bering Strait region.  
 
These have been significant steps forward, and we do not 
intend to minimize their importance. At the same time, more must 
be done to implement shipping measures that promote safety, 
minimize conflicts with subsistence users, and reduce risk to the 
marine environment. These necessary actions must occur in the 
context of broader improvements in the management of Arctic 
resources.  
 
The following sections emphasize the need for holistic 
management in the face of a rapidly changing climate; describe 
more granular shipping-focused mitigation actions designed to 
improve safety, reduce the threat of oil spills, decrease harmful 
discharges, and reduce other vessel-related impacts to the Arctic 
marine ecosystem; and examine opportunities to curb vessel 
emissions in Arctic waters and beyond—for the benefit of the Arctic 
marine ecosystem and the entire ocean. 
 
A.  The Need for Holistic and Inclusive Governance in the 
Arctic – and the Need to Look Beyond Arctic Shipping 
to Address Global Climate Change 
 
Thus far, this Article has focused on managing the risks of 
increasing vessel traffic in U.S. Arctic waters. While the risks 
associated with increasing vessel traffic are substantial on their own, 
they exist in conjunction with profound and rapid climate change 
and hazards associated with the expansion of other commercial 
activities. These activities and changes necessitate holistic, inclusive 
management for the region’s natural resources. 
It is impossible to consider measures intended to address 
threats posed by shipping in the Arctic without acknowledging the 
broader context of climate change. As explained earlier, climate 
change is having substantial and disproportionate impacts on Arctic 
ecosystems and communities. Simply addressing emissions from 
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shipping, while necessary, will be insufficient to address the global 
problem. Rather, global action to reduce emissions is urgently 
needed. The recent U.S. Climate Assessment172 and the IPCC 1.5° 
report173 make clear that each sector that contributes to climate 
change must do its part to drive systemic change. At a global scale, 
all nations must work together to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Reducing or eliminating emissions from shipping must be part of 
that action.  
Moreover, changing climate and the growth in vessel traffic 
will likely be accompanied by commercial fishing and offshore oil 
and gas exploration expanding to new areas in the Arctic. Successful 
management will require a comprehensive approach that 
coordinates across a full range of uses, agencies, and stakeholders. 
Currently, more than twenty federal agencies have management 
responsibilities in the Arctic.174 Sovereign tribal governments, state 
and municipal governments and other tribal organizations, including 
co-management bodies, have governance responsibilities, and many 
other commercial, recreational, and conservation stakeholders have 
a stake in the region as well.175  
 
This siloed management is ineffective and often results in 
analyses that fail to consider potential cumulative impacts of 
commercial and industrial uses—together with climate change—in 
a comprehensive way.176 An integrated approach is needed to 
 
172 See generally U.S. Global Change Res. Program, FOURTH NATIONAL 
CLIMATE ASSESSMENT VOLS. I & II (NCA4) (2018).  
173 See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, SPECIAL REPORT: 
GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C. (2018). 
174 Joel Clement et. al., MANAGING FOR THE FUTURE IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING 
ARCTIC: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, 32 (2013), 
https://www.afsc.noaa.gov/publications/misc_pdf/iamreport.pdf, 
[https://perma.cc/S7C9-DUTV]. 
175 Id. at 1. 
176 Id. at 38 (noting the “largely balkanized management system for the Arctic” 
is straining to cope with a rapidly changing region and growing “economic, 
environmental, cultural, and social expectations.”). 
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improve efficiencies, work across jurisdictional boundaries, and 
consider and manage for cumulative impacts across uses.177 
 
In developing comprehensive management for the region, 
Tribes must have meaningful involvement in decision-making.178 
Bering Strait region “[T]ribes have a strong desire to be direct 
participants in the design, justification and implementation of 
protections.”179 However, there is currently no formal role in 
management, either domestically or at the IMO, for Tribes.180 
Utilizing Traditional Knowledge in management decisions is also 
key, and provides a wealth of information. According to Julie 
Raymond-Yakoubian, a social scientist with Kawerak, Inc. and a 
leading scholar on the co-production of knowledge: 
 
If indigenous communities are consulted and 
included in decision-making this vast body of 
Traditional Knowledge will be accessible and can be 
used to formulate effective monitoring and 
management of vessel traffic and other activities in 
the region. Indigenous communities must be 
meaningfully and equitably involved in order for this 
to be successful.181 
 
As noted above, the NBSCRA offered one potential model 
for an inclusive and coordinated governance structure for the region 
that includes a meaningful role for Tribes. While the Executive 
Order did not do everything the Tribes requested, it was a significant 
 
177 Id. at 2-3. 
178 Arctic Vessel Traffic and Indigenous Communities, supra note 9, at 290–91. 
179 Conceptual and institutional Frameworks, supra note 8, at 97–98. 
180 See Levon Sevunts, World maritime body presents Polar Code to Arctic 




181 Arctic Vessel Traffic and Indigenous Communities, supra note 9, at 292.  
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step forward for coordinated management with a role for Tribes and 
serves as an example of what a coordinated, inclusive management 
structure might look like in the Bering Strait region.  
 
Canada’s Indigenous Protected Areas offer another example 
of a coordinated, inclusive governance structure with Indigenous 
management at its core. “Indigenous Protected Areas [IPAs] are 
based on the idea of a protected area explicitly designed to 
accommodate and support an Indigenous vision of a working 
landscape.”182 They provide for conservation measures while also 
prioritizing hiring of Indigenous People via monitoring and guardian 
programs. They also provide a means for healing and reconciliation 
by supporting communities and individuals in regaining land-based 
life skills, reconnecting youth with their cultural traditions and 
language, collecting and documenting Indigenous knowledge, and 
guaranteeing that there will always be ‘places that are theirs.’183 
Canada’s first Indigenous Protected Area, the Edéhzhíe Protected 
Area in Fort Providence, NWT, was established by the Dehcho First 
Nations and the Canadian Government in 2018.184 Inuit are leading 
development of several potential marine  Indigenous Protected 
 
182 Mary Simon, A New Shared Arctic Leadership Model, INDIGENOUS AND 
NORTHERN AFFAIRS CANADA 19 (March 2017), 
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/aanc-inac/R74-38-2017-
eng.pdf, [ https://perma.cc/24TJ-P7BH].  
183 Id.  
184 Mieke Coppes, For the first time in Canadian history, there is an official 
Indigenous protected area, HIGH NORTH NEWS (Oct. 22, 2018), 
https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/first-indigenous-protected-area-designated-
canada, [https://perma.cc/7NWY-5JFR]. 
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Areas in the Arctic, including Imappivut in northern Labrador185 and 
Pikialasorsuaq in northern Baffin Bay.186  
 
Canadian law provides several other mechanisms for 
creating marine protected areas, including Marine Protected Areas, 
National Marine Conservation Areas, and National Wildlife 
Areas.187 These mechanisms require federal agencies to negotiate 
with both Indigenous land claims organizations and Inuit 
communities to establish a protected area.188 Under these provisions, 
the Government of Canada (Parks Canada), the Nunavut 
Government and the Qikiqtani Inuit Association agreed to establish 
Tallurutiup Imanga National Marine Conservation Area at the 
eastern entrance of the Northwest Passage.189 Once formally 
established, Tallurutiup Imanga will be the largest marine protected 
area in Canada.190 To date, a boundary has been negotiated, and the 
Canadian government and Qikiqtani Inuit Association have 
announced a package of conservation jobs and infrastructure 
benefits for the conservation area.191 Collaborative management 
 
185 Levon Sevunts, Inuit traditional knowledge to guide marine management 




186 Dept. of Fisheries & Oceans Canada, Pikialasorsuaq (North Water Polynya) 
(Aug. 1, 2019), http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/management-
gestion/pikialasorsuaq-eng.html, [https://perma.cc/7ZFN-ATD5].  
187 Indigenous Protected Areas and Marine Conservation, OCEANS NORTH, 
https://oceansnorth.org/en/what-we-do/indigenous-protected-areas-marine-
conservation/, [https://perma.cc/5PE5-Y8Q6] (last visited August 27, 2019). 
188 Id. 
189 Canada’s newest and largest Marine Protected Area: Tallurutiup Imanga–




190 Id.  
191 National Marine Conservation Areas: Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreement, 
PARKS CANADA (Aug. 1, 2019) https://www.pc.gc.ca/en/amnc-nmca/cnamnc-
cnnmca/tallurutiup-imanga/entente-agreement, [https://perma.cc/J2S5-B982]. 
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between Inuit and Canada, and ensuring benefits to Inuit in the 
region from the designation, are at the heart of the agreement.192 
 
Canada’s recognition of underlying rights for Indigenous 
Peoples is notably different than that of the Unites States.193 While 
the underlying legal frameworks are different, the Canadian 
approaches serve as important examples that can inform efforts in 
the U.S., and these concepts could be applied with the appropriate 
enabling legislation. 
 
B.  Managing for Increasing Vessel Traffic in the U.S. 
Arctic: Improving Safety and Reducing Risks to the 
Marine Environment 
 
Beyond comprehensive governance changes, regulators and 
stakeholders could act to put in place specific vessel traffic 
management measures that would go further to help prevent 
accidents, reduce the risks from oil spills, reduce air, water, and 
noise pollution, and protect marine mammals. This section outlines 





See also Tallurutiup Imanga National Marine Conservation Area, PARKS 
CANADA (undated), https://www.pc.gc.ca/en/amnc-nmca/cnamnc-
cnnmca/tallurutiup-imanga, [https://perma.cc/8Q7C-T97J].  
192 Id. See also Tallurutiup Imanga National Marine Conservation Area, PARKS 
CANADA (undated), https://www.pc.gc.ca/en/amnc-nmca/cnamnc-
cnnmca/tallurutiup-imanga, [https://perma.cc/8Q7C-T97J].  
193 See Melanie Zurba et al., Indigenous Protected and Conserved Areas 
(IPCAs), Aichi Target 11 and Canada’s Pathway to Target 1: Focusing 
Conservation on Reconciliation 8 Land 1, 4–6 (2019), 
https://doi.org/10.3390/land8010010, [https://perma.cc/7UC2-QKFV]. Cf. 
DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 
265–324 (3d ed. 2012). 
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1.  Adopt Preventative Measures to Further Reduce the Risk of 
Vessel Accidents in the Arctic 
 
Traveling by boat in the Arctic will always involve some 
degree of risk, both to mariners and passengers. Nonetheless, it is 
possible to implement additional measures designed to reduce the 
risk of maritime accidents that jeopardize human safety and—if 
such accidents do occur—improve the efficacy of response efforts. 
Measures could include designating additional formal vessel traffic 
routes, applying Polar Code safety provisions to a broader range of 
vessels, updating navigational charts, and supplementing vessel 
traffic monitoring systems. 
 
As noted above, the IMO adopted ATBAs in the Aleutian 
Islands and the Bering Strait region and two-way vessel traffic lanes 
for the Bering Strait region. Additional routing measures could 
further enhance safety in the region. To that end, the United States 
and Russia should move forward with a joint proposal to designate 
a transboundary ATBA around the Diomede Islands in the middle 
of the Bering Strait. Such an ATBA could provide important 
safeguards to ships transiting the Strait by helping to ensure they 
keep a safe distance from the shores of these islands.  
 
Stakeholders in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas should also 
take advantage of the U.S Coast Guard’s PARS for the Alaskan 
Arctic Coast to consider whether designation of ATBAs and traffic 
lanes would improve safety in those waters. Among other things, 
designating formal traffic lanes could encourage more predictable 
vessel movement and could help ensure that designated routes are 
charted to modern standards and free from navigational hazards. 
Designation of ATBAs could encourage vessels to steer clear of 
potentially dangerous areas, or areas where large vessels may 
encounter Indigenous hunters in small craft. As stakeholders and 
regulators explore the potential for additional ATBAs, they should 
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consider the possibility of seasonal or dynamic ATBAs that adjust 
to changing conditions—either in real time or on a seasonal basis.194 
These options—particularly dynamic ATBAs—would require good 
data and communication among regulators, mariners and other 
affected stakeholders.195 In all cases, identification of potential 
vessel traffic lanes and ATBAs should involve meaningful 
collaboration with Indigenous residents of the region to ensure their 
perspectives guide the process, along with other factors including 
safety and freedom of navigation.   
 
In addition to improving safety through the identification 
and designation of additional vessel traffic lanes and ATBAs, the 
IMO should broaden key provisions of the Polar Code so that they 
apply to additional categories of vessels. As noted above, existing 
Polar Code safety provisions do not apply to fishing vessels, even 
though there are more fishing vessels operating in Arctic waters than 
any other category of vessel.196 Some officials contemplated 
expanding the scope of the Polar Code to cover additional vessel 
types even before the current version of the Code took effect.197 
More recently, the IMO started to actively consider such an 
expansion. In a late-2018 meeting, the IMO’s Maritime Safety 
Committee agreed on a “roadmap” that could result in adoption of 
 
194 Siders et al., supra note 16, at 181–83. 
195 Id. 
196 Hendrik Schopmans, Revisiting the Polar Code: Where Do We Stand? Arctic 
Institute, CTR. FOR CIRCUMPOLAR SECURITY STUDIES (June 11, 2019). 
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/revisiting-polar-code/, 
[https://perma.cc/C3GW-DEGX]. 
197 See, e.g., Craig H. Allen, Polar Code rings in the New Year for Arctic 
shipping, PAC. MARITIME MAG. (Dec. 1, 2016) 
https://www.pacmar.com/story/2016/12/01/features/polar-code-rings-in-the-
new-year-for-arctic-shipping/474.html, [https://perma.cc/AE83-A8YM] (noting 
that in 2015, a U.S. State Department official “suggested that the IMO member-
states may review whether to extend the Code's safety measures to non-SOLAS 
vessels” including fishing vessels and other smaller vessels). 
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revisions to the Polar Code and/or SOLAS by 2022.198 In 2019, the 
Committee tasked a subcommittee with considering “the 
consequences and feasibility” of applying key chapters of the Polar 
Code to additional categories of vessel.199 At the same meeting, the 
Committee approved a draft resolution urging IMO Member States 
to voluntarily implement “safety measures of the Polar Code on 
ships not certified under the SOLAS Convention.”200 The IMO 
Assembly will consider adopting the draft resolution in late 2019.201   
 
Improvements to information infrastructure could also 
bolster maritime safety in the Arctic. Less than two percent of U.S. 
Arctic waters have been charted using modern survey methods.202 
Updates to nautical charts in the U.S. Arctic should be prioritized 
and accelerated. Recent years have witnessed significant advances 
in the use of automatic identification system (AIS) technologies, 
which use VHF and satellites to transmit information about a 
vessel’s location and other information from the vessel to shore and 
to other vessels, in real-time or near real-time. At present, AIS is 
used to avoid collisions between vessels, monitor vessel traffic in 
U.S. Arctic waters, and encourage regulatory compliance.203 AIS 
 
198 Int’l Maritime Org., Maritime Safety Comm. (MSC), 100th session, 3–7 Dec. 
2018. 
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/MSC/Pages/MSC-
100th-session.aspx, [https://perma.cc/B9EY-USAR].  
199 Int’l Maritime Org., Maritime Safety Comm. (MSC), 101st session, 5–14 
June 2019. 
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/MSC/Pages/MSC-
101st-session.aspx, [https://perma.cc/UBX9-J47Y].  
200 Id.  
201 Id.  
202 Comm. on the Marine Transp. Sys., A TEN-YEAR PRIORITIZATION OF 




203 See, e.g., Monitoring Center, ALASKA MARITIME PREVENTION & RESPONSE 
NETWORK, https://www.alaskaseas.org/vessel-monitoring/monitoring-center/, 
[https://perma.cc/654X-AZ7D] (describing use of AIS to monitor vessel traffic 
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systems, however, are capable of much more. A Coast Guard 
research and development program explored the viability of using 
AIS to transmit relevant safety and navigation information to ships 
in real-time, on an as-needed basis.204 This could include 
information about the presence of subsistence hunters or dangerous 
weather conditions, among other things.205 The Coast Guard should 
facilitate these advances in navigation technologies to improve 
communication and safety in Arctic waters. 
 
2.  Reducing the Risk from Oil Spills in Arctic Waters 
 
As noted above, the vast majority of vessels operating in 
Arctic waters use some form of oil to power their engines. Some of 
these vessels run on heavy fuel oil, which poses a particular threat 
when spilled.206 Some of these vessels carry large volumes—up to 
100,000 barrels—of oil-based fuel as cargo,207 and some engage in 
lightering operations that transfer fuel from one ship to another. All 
of these vessels and operations contribute to the risk of a potentially 
catastrophic oil spill in Arctic waters, and all point to the need to 
adopt additional measures to minimize that risk.   
 
If implemented, many of the recommendations from the 
previous section would decrease the likelihood of oil spills. 
Designation of additional vessel traffic lanes and ATBAs can reduce 
 
to aid compliance and identify deviations and emergencies); see also Superior 
vessel tracking with state of the art vessel monitoring, 1-CALL ALASKA: A 
RESOLVE COMPANY, https://1callalaska.com/services/vessel-tracking/, 
[https://perma.cc/2Z44-4WGJ] (describing vessel monitoring system). 
204 Irene Gonin & Gregory Johnson, Alaska AIS Transmit Prototype Test, 
Evaluation, and Transition Summary Report, U.S. COAST GUARD ACQUISITION 
DIRECTORATE: RES. & DEV. CTR. (Oct. 2018). 
205 See id., at 27, 30. 
206 Bryan Comer & Naya Olmer, Heavy fuel oil is considered the most 
significant threat to the Arctic. So why isn’t it banned yet?, INT’L COUNCIL ON 
CLEAN TRANSP. (Sept. 15, 2016), https://theicct.org/blogs/staff/heavy-fuel-oil-
considered-most-significant-threat-to-arctic, [https://perma.cc/H6L7-53B6]. 
207 BERING SEA RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 25, at 52. 
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the chance of accidents by making traffic patterns more predictable, 
keeping ships away from dangerous areas, and helping ships stay in 
waters that have been charted to modern standards.208 Moreover, to 
the extent that additional ATBAs and vessel traffic routes encourage 
vessels to stay away from ecologically sensitive areas, these 
measures could help minimize impacts from any oil spills that do 
occur. Although oil spilled in the marine environment will move 
with wind and currents, thoughtfully-designed vessel traffic lanes 
and ATBAs could help keep oil from reaching environmentally 
sensitive areas. 
 
Beyond the measures discussed in the previous section, there 
are other ways to reduce the risk from oil spills in the Arctic. 
Eliminating the use of heavy fuel oil is one such measure.209 Vessels 
are already prohibited from using heavy fuel oil in Antarctic 
waters210 and the Polar Code recommends—but does not require—
that mariners avoid using heavy fuel oil in the Arctic.211 In 2017, the 
IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee agreed to 
develop measures designed to reduce the risks of the use of heavy 
fuel oil as fuel by ships in Arctic waters.212 The following year, a 
group of member countries, led by Finland, proposed banning heavy 
fuel oil as a shipping fuel in Arctic waters. The proposal noted that 
a single heavy fuel oil spill “could have devastating and lasting 
effects on fragile Arctic marine and coastal environments,” and that 
 
208 See supra Part V.B.I (discussing benefits of ATBAs).  
209 Det Norske Veritas, REPORT: HEAVY FUEL IN THE ARCTIC (PHASE 1) 2 (2011), 
https://www.pame.is/images/03_Projects/HFO/HFO_in_the_Artic_Phase_I.pdf, 
[https://perma.cc/6TW3-EFTW] (noting that due to the particular properties of 
heavy fuel oil, “significant risk reduction will be achieved” by switching from 
heavy fuel oil to distillate fuel-types in the Arctic). 
210 MARPOL, supra note 85, at Annex 1, Reg. 43, Ch. 9, “Special Requirements 
for the Use or Carriage of Oils in the Antarctic Area.” 
211 POLAR CODE, supra note 130, at Part II-B, Ch. 1.1. 
212 See, e.g., Int’l Maritime Org, Marine Env’t Prot. Comm. (MEPC), 71st 
session, 3–7 July 2017, 
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/MEPC/Pages/MEPC-
71.aspx, [https://perma.cc/DHR2-NNFW].  
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a ban on heavy fuel oil “should be implemented as soon as 
possible.”213 In its October 2018 meeting, the Marine Environment 
Protection Committee tasked a subcommittee with developing “a 
ban on heavy fuel oil for use and carriage as fuel by ships in Arctic 
waters, based on an assessment of the impacts of such a ban.”214 The 
IMO should finalize, adopt, and implement a ban on heavy fuel oil 
in Arctic waters as quickly as possible. This could be accomplished 
via an amendment to MARPOL Annex 1 or by another legally 
binding instrument.  
 
A ban on heavy fuel oil in the Arctic would be a significant 
step in reducing the threat posed by oil spills there. Ultimately, 
however, switching from distillates to alternative, non-fossil fuels 
would offer even greater protection against oil spills. In the near 
term, use of LNG as a marine fuel would virtually eliminate the 
impacts of a fuel spill, because LNG will “immediately start to 
vaporize after a release” and will “disperse rapidly depending on the 
local wind conditions.”215 In general, an LNG spill would be “far 
more benign than either [heavy fuel oil] or diesel oil spills.”216 Even 
so, LNG is still a fossil fuel, and its combustion contributes to global 
warming.217 For that and other reasons, other fuel alternatives—
including battery-power—are preferred options. 
 
213 Int’l Maritime Org., Marine Env’t Prot. Comm. (MEPC), 72d session, agenda 
item 11, Development of Measures to Reduce Risks of Use and Carriage of 
Heavy Fuel Oil as Fuel by Ships in Arctic Waters: Proposal to ban heavy fuel 
oil use and carriage as fuel by ships in Arctic waters, submitted by Finland, 
Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the 
United States (Feb. 2, 2018),  
https://www.transportstyrelsen.se/contentassets/57f800efae134fe0af0808d2773a
14f2/72-11-1.pdf, [https://perma.cc/Z6CL-SAWH].  
214 Int’l Maritime Org., Marine Env’t Prot. Comm. (MEPC), 73rd session, 22–26 
Oct. 2018, 
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/MEPC/Pages/MEPC-
73rd-session.aspx, [https://perma.cc/HA4Q-URHP].  
215 Vard Marine, supra note 101, at 36. 
216 Id.  
217 See, e.g., id. at 33 (concluding that while using LNG as a marine fuel will 
emit less CO2 and CO2 equivalent than conventional fuels, reduction of 
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Another opportunity to reduce the risk of oil spills in Arctic 
waters involves improving the safety of lightering operations. 
Businesses engaged in lightering in western and Arctic Alaska, with 
the support of the Coast Guard, are already beginning to discuss 
ways to bolster safety and reduce risks in the region.218 As those 
discussions continue, operators should consider identifying areas 
best suited for lightering operations or areas where lightering should 
not occur.219 In selecting these areas, operators should seek out and 
incorporate input from residents of local communities.220 
Identification of specific lightering areas may identify regions or 
corridors where updated hydrographic surveys would most benefit 
lightering operations, which could help avoid accidents caused by 
outdated or inaccurate charting.221 Lightering operators could also 
develop a shared suite of best practices designed to help ensure ship-
to-ship transfers take place only when weather, wind, and sea 
conditions are safe and when available spill response equipment can 
be deployed effectively.222 They could also consider whether 
existing oil spill response equipment is best suited to the conditions 
where lightering operations take place.223 Use of onboard cameras 
could be a cost-effective way to improve safety via remote 
monitoring of lightering operations.224 Other risk mitigation tools 
may include drills and exercises to practice rapid deployment of spill 
response equipment as well as table-top or field exercises to test 
 
greenhouse gas emissions will not be as dramatic as reductions in NOx, Sox and 
particulate matter emissions).  
218 Personal communication, Cap’t Patrick Hilbert, Chief of Prevention, U.S. 
Coast Guard Dist. 17 (Juneau, AK).  
219 OVERVIEW OF TANKER LIGHTERING, supra note 24, at 35. 
220 Id.  
221 Id. at 34; see also id. at 19–20 (describing the soft grounding of tanker 
involved in lightering operations in western Alaska in an area where water depth 
shown on nautical chart was inaccurate). 
222 Id. at 35.  
223 Id. at 36. 
224 Id. at 34. 
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preparedness for incidents including grounding or loss-of-
propulsion events.225 
 
Finally, impacts from oil spills could be reduced if local 
communities had additional spill response equipment and training. 
With response assets located thousands of miles away from the 
Bering Strait, “Indigenous communities are likely to be first 
responders to any accident in the Bering Strait.”226 While locating 
appropriate response equipment in communities and training 
community members to use it would not lower the risk of a spill, it 
could reduce the severity of its consequences. 
 
3.  Implement Measures to Mitigate Impacts Related to the 
Discharge of Sewage and Graywater  
 
Residents of the Bering Strait region have expressed concern 
about the impacts of discharge from vessels into the marine 
environment.227 As noted above, IMO regulations impose no 
restrictions on the discharge of graywater from vessels and allow 
discharge of even raw sewage so long as a vessel is moving at least 
four knots and is positioned at least twelve nautical miles from land 
or ice.228 
 
International standards governing the discharge should be 
strengthened. At a minimum, the IMO should require ships to treat 
discharge graywater in the same way they are required to treat 
discharge of sewage. This could be done via an amendment to 
 
225 Id. at 36–37.  
226 Arctic Vessel Traffic and Indigenous Communities, supra note 9, at 291. 
227 See, e.g., Kawerak, Inc., BERING STRAIT VOICES ON ARCTIC SHIPPING: 
MOVING FORWARD TO PROTECT ALASKA NATIVE WAYS OF LIFE AND THE 
NATURAL RESOURCES WE RELY ON 12 (2016), [https://perma.cc/8ZNL-E859] 
(describing resident of Elim voice concern over ships dumping wastes in the 
water).  
228 See supra Part III.B.3. 
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MARPOL and/or the Polar Code. IMO could also go further and 
require ships to be even farther from shore or ice—more than twelve 
nautical miles—before discharging untreated sewage or 
graywater.229 Similarly, IMO could amend MARPOL and/or the 
Polar Code to require more additional testing, sampling, monitoring 
and record-keeping with respect to wastewater treatment plants and 
discharge of sewage and graywater in Arctic waters.230  
 
In addition to ship-based discharge limits, discharge can be 
regulated by area-based protections. In the United States, individual 
states may apply to the Environmental Protection Agency to 
establish no-discharge zones for sewage in state waters,231 but this 
type of no-discharge zone would apply only within three nautical 
miles of the shore and therefore would have limited benefit.232 No-
discharge zones can also be created in international waters by 
designating a “special area” that limits discharge of sewage pursuant 
to Annex IV of MARPOL.233 At present, the Baltic Sea is the only 
Annex IV special area,234 and its protections are just beginning to be 
phased in.235 Nonetheless, it may be useful to explore the possibility 
of proposing one or more additional Annex IV special areas in 
 
229 See Parks et al., supra note 84, at 7 (suggesting IMO impose more stringent 
regulations on discharges of sewage and graywater).  
230 Id. at 7. 
231 33 U.S.C. § 1322(f)(3); see also 40 C.F.R. § 140.4.  
232 Parks et al., supra note 84, at 8. 
233 Under MARPOL, special areas are defined as areas where “for technical 
reasons relating to their oceanographical and ecological condition and to their 
sea traffic, the adoption of special mandatory methods for the prevention of sea 
pollution is required.” Int’l Maritime Org., Special Areas Under MARPOL 
(undated),  
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/SpecialAreasUnderMARPOL/Pa
ges/Default.aspx, [https://perma.cc/P2A7-YRB4] (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). 
234 Int’l Maritime Org., Special Areas under MARPOL (undated),  
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/SpecialAreasUnderMARPOL/Pa
ges/Default.aspx, [https://perma.cc/P2A7-YRB4].  
235 See DNG-VL, Baltic Sea – First Marpol special area for sewage (Sept. 18, 
2017), https://www.dnvgl.com/news/baltic-sea-first-marpol-special-area-for-
sewage-100367, [https://perma.cc/44A8-Q48A] (listing dates that Baltic Sea 
special area will take effect for certain vessel types). 
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Arctic waters. Indigenous residents have called for a no discharge 
zone in the Bering Strait for many years, due to its importance to 
marine mammals and the communities who depend on them.236 
 
To the extent that vessels traveling in the Arctic are 
prohibited from discharging or elect not to discharge sewage and 
graywater, they will need to store those wastes onboard. Polar Code 
regulations could be strengthened to call for increased storage 
capacity for vessels traveling in Arctic waters.237 In addition, it 
would be beneficial to increase the availability of port facilities 
where vessels can safely offload these and other wastes. If these 
“port reception facilities” were more widely available in Arctic 
waters, it could facilitate designation of an Annex IV special area.238 
Establishing adequate port reception facilities in the U.S. Arctic 
could be costly239 and would require close collaboration with 
residents of the Arctic to ensure their communities were not unduly 
burdened by accepting wastes from ships.240 Nonetheless, if done 
 
236 Arctic Vessel Traffic and Indigenous Communities, supra note 9, at 291.  
237 See Parks et al., supra note 84, at 7. 
238 See, e.g., Int’l Maritime Org., Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 
1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships, 1973: Special Area Provisions and the Designation of the Baltic Sea 
as a Special Area under MARPOL Annex IV, MARINE ENV’T PROT. COMM. RES. 
200(62) § 4 (July 15 2011) (adding new regulation requiring availability of 
adequate port reception facilities before special area designation takes effect), 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/Sewage/Doc
uments/200(62).pdf, [https://perma.cc/8QVV-V4EM]. See also Alex Kemp & 
Gudmund Bernitz, Port reception facilities for waste water in the Baltic Sea: fit 
for purpose? HFW BRIEFINGS (October 2017), http://www.hfw.com/Port-
reception-facilities-for-waste-water-in-the-Baltic-Sea-fit-for-purpose-October-
2017, [https://perma.cc/6E5P-CAV7] (observing that implementation of the 
Baltic Sea special area was “initially subject to sufficient notifications to the 
IMO on the availability of adequate [Port Reception Facilities] from states 
bordering the Baltic Sea”). 
239 Parks et al., supra note 84, at 7.  
240 See, e.g., Alex Kemp & Gudmund Bernitz, supra note 238 (noting that local 
wastewater management systems may not be well-suited to accept sewage from 
ships, “which may contain heavy fuel oil and other contaminants”). 
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properly, build-out of these facilities would be a critical investment 
for a clean, healthy Arctic marine environment in the future. 
 
4.  Curb Subsea Noise in Arctic Waters 
 
In 2014, the IMO adopted voluntary Guidelines for the 
Reduction of Underwater Noise from Commercial Shipping to 
Address Adverse Impacts on Marine Life.241 Among other things, 
the Guidelines provide guidance on designing quieter ships and 
reducing noise from existing ships.242 Ship designers and operators 
should use these guidelines to help reduce noise in Arctic waters. 
The IMO guidance recommends operational measures like slowing 
down to reduce propeller cavitation—the main source of noise from 
ships243—and using routing measures to keep vessels away from 
areas that may be particularly sensitive to undersea noise from 
ships.244 Another alternative is to employ measures designed to 
maintain the relative quiet of areas that are not yet subject to 
significant amounts of undersea noise.245  
 
Port-based incentives are another way to encourage quieter 
vessels. The Vancouver Fraser Port Authority instituted an 
“EcoAction Program” that allows vessels that use technologies to 
reduce underwater noise (and other environmental impacts) to apply 
 
241 Int’l Maritime Org., Guidelines for the Reduction of Underwater Noise from 
Commercial Shipping to Address Adverse Impacts on Marine Life, 
MEPC.1/Circ.833 (April 7, 2014), 
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Documents/833%20Guidance%
20on%20reducing%20underwater%20noise%20from%20commercial%20shippi
ng%2C.pdf, [https://perma.cc/2G79-FUBH].  
242 Id. §§ 7–10. 
243 Id. § 3.2; § 10.4. 
244 Id. § 10.5. 
245 R. Williams et al., Impacts of Anthropogenic Noise on Marine Life: 
Publication Patterns, New Discoveries, and Future Directions in Research and 
Management, 115 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 17, 23 (2015). 
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for up to a 47% reduction in harbor fees.246 The program recognizes 
four “quiet ship notations” from organizations that establish industry 
standards, as well as five propeller designs that help reduce 
underwater noise from ships.247 Ships with one or more of these 
quiet ship notations, performance indicator level, or technologies are 
eligible to apply for the reduced fees.248 Regulators, port authorities 
and other stakeholders should consider how routing measures and 
port-based incentives might be used to encourage quieter shipping 
in Arctic waters. 
 
More work is needed to understand and address impacts of 
underwater noise from vessel traffic. Recognizing this, a number of 
delegations to the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection 
Committee continue to express interest in more research to better 
understand the impacts of underwater noise from shipping.249 In 
addition, the Arctic Council’s Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment’s work plan for 2019-2021 includes a project designed 
to estimate and map vessel noise levels in the Arctic, identify areas 





246 Vancouver Fraser Port Authority expands noise reduction criteria to 
encourage quieter waters for endangered whales, PORT OF VANCOUVER (Feb. 
11, 2019), https://www.portvancouver.com/news-and-media/news/vancouver-
fraser-port-authority-expands-noise-reduction-criteria-to-encourage-quieter-
waters-for-endangered-whales/, [https://perma.cc/TKQ7-G5CJ].  
247 Id. 
248 Id.  
249 Ship Noise: Ship noise can have negative impacts—on both humans and 
marine life, INT’L MARITIME ORG.,  
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pages/Noise.aspx, 
[.https://perma.cc/WYK4-SG4R].  
250 Arctic Council, PAME WORK PLAN 2019-2021 31, 
https://pame.is/index.php/document-library/pame-reports-new/pame-ministerial-
deliverables/2019-11th-arctic-council-ministerial-meeting-rovaniemi-
finland/426-pame-2019-2021-work-plan/file, [https://perma.cc/2XAT-KHUZ].  
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5.  Reduce the Risk of Ship Strikes 
 
It is possible to take steps to minimize the risk of ship strikes 
on large, slow-moving whales in Arctic waters. Scientists, 
indigenous experts, mariners, and other stakeholders could work 
together to identify areas where there is a high risk of ship strikes. 
Regulators could designate vessel traffic lanes and ATBAs that are, 
to the extent possible, designed to keep large or fast-moving vessels 
away from areas where large whales are known to aggregate. 
Regulators could also consider the potential for seasonal or dynamic 
routing measures to better account for seasonal migration.251 In 
cases where it is impractical to keep vessels away from large whales, 
regulators should encourage or mandate speeds of less than ten knots 
when large whales are known to be in the vicinity.252 As noted 
above, new technologies that integrate with ships’ AIS and 
navigation equipment could allow mariners to be notified 
automatically when they are entering areas of known marine 
mammal aggregations.253 In addition to reducing the risk of ship 
strikes on whales, improved communication between residents of 
Arctic communities and vessels could also reduce the potential for 
conflicts or accidents between commercial vessels and subsistence 
hunters operating small craft. 
 
6.  Prevent the Spread of Invasive Species in Arctic Waters 
 
Because marine invasive species are nearly impossible to 
remove once they have taken hold,254 prevention is the best 
 
251 Siders et al., supra note 16, at 181–83. See also Huntington et al., supra note 
140, at §§ 4–6.  
252 See, e.g., Reducing Ship Strikes to North Atlantic Right Whales, NAT’L 




253 See supra Part V.B.I. 
254 Molnar et al., supra note 124, at 485. 
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approach. The IMO has adopted a mandatory convention to address 
the spread of invasive species from one region to another via ballast 
water,255 and has approved voluntary guidelines to address the 
spread of invasive species via biofouling.256 Outside the IMO, the 
Arctic Council’s working groups on Conservation of Arctic Flora 
and Fauna and Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment 
published an Action Plan on Arctic invasive alien species.257 While 
the Action Plan recognizes ballast water and hull fouling as a vector 
for invasive species in Arctic waters,258 it does not offer specific 
suggestions beyond encouraging nations to collaborate “to 
implement effective programs for preventing the introduction and 
controlling the spread of invasive alien species,”259 and assess 
whether the IMO should develop Arctic-specific guidance for 
minimizing the spread of invasive species from shipping.260  
Development of an Arctic-specific plan to address the spread of 
marine invasive species from shipping may be the most appropriate 
next step. Such a plan could trigger more stringent treatment or 
enforcement standards for ballast water, and more robust or 
effective hull-cleaning requirements to minimize hull fouling. In 
addition, scientific monitoring and assessment of invasion risk 
related to vessel traffic in the Arctic should continue. 
 
 
255 See, e.g., International Convention for the Control and Management of 




256 Int’l Maritime Org., 2011 Guidelines for the Control and Management of 
Ships’ Biofouling to Minimize the Transfer of Invasive Aquatic Species, MPEC 
62/24/Add. 1 (July 15, 2011), 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Biofouling/Documents/RESOLU
TION%20MEPC.207%5b62%5d.pdf, [https://perma.cc/W74D-L4LN]. 
257 Arctic Council, Arctic Invasive Alien Species: Strategy and Action Plan 
(2017), https://www.caff.is/strategies-series/415-arctic-invasive-alien-species-
strategy-and-action-plan, [https://perma.cc/X2NQ-NF6V].  
258 Id., at 9. 
259 Id., at 12. 
260 Id., at 13. 
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7.  Consider Designation of One of More Particularly Sensitive 
Sea Areas 
 
As defined by the IMO, a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area 
(PSSA) “is an area that needs special protection through action by 
IMO because of its significance for recognized ecological, socio-
economic, or scientific attributes where such attributes may be 
vulnerable to damage by international shipping activities.”261 
PSSAs provide a way to package together multiple IMO mitigation 
measures. In the PSSA context, these mitigation measures are called 
“associated protective measures,” and they are adopted along with 
the PSSA.262  
 
Associated protective measures can include Special Area or 
Emissions Control Area designation, application of special 
discharge restrictions, routing and reporting measures (including 
ATBAs) and “development and adoption of other measures aimed 
at protecting specific sea areas against environmental damage from 
ships, provided that they have an identified legal basis.”263 There are 
a variety of criteria for designation as a PSSA, and specific 
parameters for its application.264 While PSSAs only provide for 
regulation of shipping impacts, their designation provides an 
opportunity for associated protective measures which cover a range 
of impacts, and therefore provide an opportunity for broad 
protections from shipping threats. Designation of a PSSA in the 
Bering Strait region—and perhaps elsewhere in the U.S. Arctic—
may be an efficient way to bundle multiple protections against 
impacts from increasing vessel traffic in the region. 
 
261 Int’l Maritime Org. Res. A.982(24), U.N. Doc. A 24/Res.982, at 3 (Dec. 1, 




263 Id., at 8. 
264 See generally id.  
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C.  Curb Harmful Emissions from Vessels in the Arctic and 
Reduce and Eventually Decarbonize the Global Shipping 
Fleet 
 
The measures discussed in the sections above are important 
to increase shipping safety, reduce the risk of oil spills, minimize 
impacts from discharge of sewage and graywater, quiet ship-related 
noise, avoid ship strikes, and prevent the spread of invasive species 
in Arctic waters. As important as those measures are, the rapid and 
profound impacts of climate change in the Arctic make it absolutely 
critical to act now to reduce emissions from vessels that operate in 
the Arctic, and to reduce and eventually eliminate carbon emissions 
from the global shipping sector. 
 
There are ways to reduce emissions from vessels operating 
in the Arctic, including area-based measures and switching to 
cleaner fuels. For instance, it is possible to design and implement 
Arctic-specific, area-based limits on emissions from vessels. This 
could be done through designation of an IMO Emissions Control 
Area (ECA) for some or all Arctic waters. ECAs are areas within 
which vessels are subject to emissions limits that are more stringent 
than normal; they are designated under MARPOL Annex VI and 
designed to reduce harmful emissions from shipping.265 At present, 
a North American ECA reaches as far north as Southeast Alaska but 
does not extend to the Arctic.266 If IMO designated an Arctic ECA 
that required the use of 0.1% sulfur fuel (consistent with the existing 
 
265 Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships, INT’L MARITIME ORG. (undated), 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution
/Pages/Air-Pollution.aspx, [https://perma.cc/8RXK-ZHCW].  
266 See generally Information on North American Emission Control Area (ECA), 
U.N. Doc. MPEC.1/Circ.723 (2010) 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/mepc1-circ-re-
na-eca.pdf, [https://perma.cc/EDJ2-TYPW].   
2020] Safety Measures in the Bering Strait Region 123 
 
North American ECA), it would result in a 50% drop in black carbon 
emissions in the Arctic.267 
 
Phasing out the use of heavy fuel oil in Arctic waters is 
another way to reduce emissions in the Arctic region. As noted 
above, contaminants in heavy fuel oil create exhaust emissions that 
are particularly dirty.268 Even so, heavy fuel oil is—for now at 
least—still used by some vessels transiting Arctic waters.269 If these 
vessels switched from heavy fuel oil to higher-quality, low-sulfur 
fuels, it would result in a substantial reduction in emissions 
including a 5–8% reduction in CO2 emissions, a 95% decrease in 
SO2, a 93% decrease in particulate SO4 emissions, and a 75% 
decrease in organic particulate emissions. Studies suggest it would 
also reduce black carbon emissions by 50% or more.270 Switching 
to LNG would result in still greater reductions in emissions,271 and 
switching to electric propulsion could eliminate emissions 
altogether, depending on the source of the electricity.  
 
While reducing emissions from vessels operating in the 
Arctic will yield important benefits, regional-scale action is 
insufficient to address the challenge of global climate change. 
Instead, it is necessary to reduce, and eventually eliminate, vessel 
emissions on a global scale. In 2018, the IMO adopted an initial 
strategy on the reduction of greenhouse gases from ships.272  
 
267 Daniel Lack, The Impacts of an Arctic Shipping HFO Ban on Emissions of 
Black Carbon 12 (Sept. 2016), https://www.hfofreearctic.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/The-Impacts-of-an-Arctic-Shipping-HFO-Ban-on-
Emissions-of-Black-Carbon.pdf, [https://perma.cc/P427-UJMB].  
268 See supra Part III.B.4. 
269 See Lack, supra note 267, at 8 (noting that 75% of fuel carried by vessels in 
the Arctic during 2012 was heavy fuel oil). 
270 Id., at 11–12. 
271 Vard Marine, supra note 101, at 33.  
272 Int’l Maritime Org., Initial IMO Strategy on reduction of GHG emissions 
from ships, Res. MEPC.304(72) (April 13, 2018) [hereinafter Initial IMO 
Strategy], 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Documents/Resolution%20MEPC.304%2872
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The IMO strategy first calls for adoption of short-term 
measures to quickly reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the 
shipping sector.273 Slow steaming could be an important way to 
achieve short-term reductions. If a ship reduces its speed by 10%, it 
can reduce fuel consumption by nearly 20%.274 On a global scale, 
researchers predict that slowing the container, dry bulk, and 
crude/product tanker fleet by 10, 20, and 30% would reduce overall 
emissions by 13, 24 and 33% respectively.275 One study of global 
shipping concluded implementation of existing technologies and 
operational measures could reduce shipping emissions from 2008 
levels by up to 75% by 2050.276  
 
The IMO strategy also calls for a plan to meet mid-term 
(2023–2030) and long-term (2030–2050) goals to curb greenhouse 
gas emissions from the shipping sector.277 IMO’s plan calls for 2050 
greenhouse gas emissions from the shipping sector to be reduced by 
at least half, relative to 2008 levels.278 Importantly, the 50% 
reduction is a floor, not a ceiling. During negotiations, a coalition of 
 
%29%20on%20Initial%20IMO%20Strategy%20on%20reduction%20of%20GH
G%20emissions%20from%20ships.pdf, [https://perma.cc/RFW9-A6U4].  
273 Id. §§ 4.1.1, 4.7. 
274 Speed Management, Global Maritime Energy Efficiency Partnership 
(undated), https://glomeep.imo.org/technology/speed-management/, 
[https://perma.cc/4FFH-DZY8].  
275 J. Faber et al., Regulating speed: a short-term measure to reduce maritime 
GHG emissions 10 (2017), https://cedelft.eu/en/publications/2024/regulating-
speed-a-short-term-measure-to-reduce-maritime-ghg-emissions, 
[https://perma.cc/M3YB-4F7L].  
276 E.  Bouman et.al. State-of-the-art technologies, measures, and potential for 
reducing GHG emissions from shipping – A review, 52 Transp. Res. Part D 408, 
418 (May 2017), 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1361920916307015, 
[https://perma.cc/XG7Q-TKFZ].  
277 Initial IMO Strategy, supra note 272, §§ 3.1.3, 4.1.2, 4.1.3. 
278 Id. at § 3.1.3. 
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states argued for complete decarbonization of the shipping sector,279 
and the IMO plan leaves room to continue to push for that approach.  
 
While transitioning to a fully decarbonized shipping sector 
by 2050 might strike some as unrealistic, at least one major player 
in the shipping industry has already pledged to achieve zero-carbon 
emissions from its fleet by 2050.280 Given the pace and scale of the 
climate challenge facing the Arctic—and the global ocean—a rapid 
and aggressive transition toward a zero-carbon shipping fleet is the 




Climate change is affecting the ocean all around the world, 
and its impacts are particularly acute in the fast-warming Arctic. Sea 
ice is melting, Arctic waters are becoming more accessible, 
extractive industries are expanding, and new trans-Arctic shipping 
routes are emerging. While there has been significant progress in 
some areas, more must be done to safeguard Arctic waters from the 
sweeping change already underway.  
 
Despite the rapid pace of change in the Arctic, there remains 
a window of opportunity to put in place additional Arctic-specific 
regulations and best practices that will bolster shipping safety and 
minimize the impacts of increased shipping on the Arctic marine 
environment—impacts that include greater risk of oil spills, 
 
279Jessica F. Green, Why do we need new rules on shipping emissions? Well, 90 
percent of global trade depends on ships, Washington Post (April 17, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/04/17/why-do-
we-need-new-rules-on-shipping-emissions-well-90-of-global-trade-depends-on-
ships/?noredirect=on, [https://perma.cc/3AW5-AN88].  
280 See, e.g., Camila Domonoske, Giant Shipper Bets Big On Ending Its Carbon 
Emissions. Will It Pay Off? NPR NEWS (July 15, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/07/15/736565697/giant-shipper-bets-big-on-ending-
its-carbon-emissions-will-it-pay-off, [https://perma.cc/J25S-NSEX].   
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discharges of sewage and graywater, subsea noise, ship strikes on 
marine mammals, and spread of invasive species.   
 
At the same time, shipping measures are only one 
component of a broader solution that must include a comprehensive 
governance structure that is able to address impacts from multiple 
sectors and uses, and that provides for full and meaningful 
involvement of Indigenous Peoples in decision-making. There is an 
urgent need to establish both an improved governance structure and 
specific protective measures now, before the anticipated increase in 
vessel traffic arrives. 
 
Finally, the Arctic is both the canary in the coal mine and a 
critical driver for climate change. Global climate change poses 
extreme threats to the Arctic, and at the same time a melting Arctic 
has impacts on our global climate, weather and sea-level rise. Given 
the profound threat posed by global climate change, it is necessary 
to reduce—and eventually eliminate—shipping-related greenhouse 
gas emissions in the Arctic and on a global scale. At the same time, 
global action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and thus slow and 
stall the pace of change in the Arctic is critical not only to the future 
of the Arctic, but to our world. The mechanisms and opportunities 
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